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RENEWING ELECTRICITY COMPETITION 
DAVID SCHRAUB* 
ABSTRACT 
 The scholarly literature on law and social movement has historically focused on public 
law issues like environmentalism, reproductive rights, and race relations, while staying far 
away from business and firm behavior. Business behavior was easily understood as that of 
self-interested profit-maximizers and thereby left to the economics. Recently, however, social 
movement theorists have begun paying more attention to the business world. While tradi-
tional economic models can explain why businesses pursue higher profits, greater market 
shares, and superior regulatory climates, they are limited in their ability to explain how 
wish becomes reality. The formation and identification of market opportunities are products 
of social forces, and firms are part of that process—both shaping and being shaped by social 
dynamics which create and recreate the economic terrain. 
 This Article joins that burgeoning literature by applying a social movements approach 
to the energy law field. Specifically, it looks to how voluntary Renewable Energy Credit 
(REC) sales—selling the “clean” in “clean electricity”—could restart the moribund movement 
towards increased electricity market competition (known as “restructuring”). While electrici-
ty restructuring gained considerable momentum from the late 1970s through the 1990s, the 
movement was crippled by the high-profile Enron collapse in 2001. Efforts to restart the 
debate have foundered as restructuring proponents have had no point of entry to connect 
with consumers or influence policymakers in states dominated by incumbent electricity mo-
nopolies. Voluntary REC sales, which entail sale of an electricity “product” that bypasses the 
physical transmission network, offers a “foot in the door” for new market entrants who can 
connect with consumers and reshape their public image free from interference by the extant 
monopoly. From a business standpoint, the benefit of entering the voluntary REC is less 
about direct revenues or profits from the sale, the traditional economic markers of success. 
Rather, REC sales are valuable for reasons well known to social movement theorists—they 
can establish relationships and alliances in previously untapped social arenas and alter 
public understandings of concepts and ideologies critical to the firm’s overall interests. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 For most of its history, the American electricity market was seen 
as the quintessential natural monopoly. Regulated both by state util-
ity commissions (generation and retail sales) and the federal gov-
ernment (wholesale transmission), it was assumed that electricity 
markets were unamenable to competition due to the high cost and 
inherently inefficient nature of replicating the massive infrastructure 
of transmission lines and local connectors necessary for a workable 
electricity grid. However, beginning almost accidentally with the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),1 and continuing in 
earnest through the 1990s, this began to change. Led by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), open-access rules were de-
signed to create a level playing field for new market-entrants who 
could piggyback on previously created infrastructure at competitive 
rates. These reforms, known as electricity deregulation or restructur-
ing, promised consumers a true choice in their electricity provider 
and with it a new era of electricity competition. 
 Today, this momentum has largely stalled out. California aborted 
its transition to electricity competition following the 2000 energy cri-
sis and Enron collapse, and many states which had previously been 
considering deregulating their electricity markets likewise held those 
plans in abeyance. As of 2010, over a dozen states (largely but not 
exclusively in the Northeast) have implemented electricity deregula-
tion.2 Concerns over market volatility and entrenched opposition 
from local utility monopolies and regulators have halted competition 
in the remainder of the United States. 
 This Article suggests that there may be a possibility for electricity 
competition to regain its footing—and it may stem from an unlikely 
source: the marketing and sale of voluntary Renewable Energy Cred-
its (RECs). RECs are, in essence, purchases of the “clean” in “clean 
electricity.” Specifically, they guarantee that a certain amount of 
clean electricity has been added to the grid. Voluntary RECs are 
those purchased by individual customers as part of an effort to be 
responsible citizens (as opposed to RECs that are purchased by utili- 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).  
 2. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. 
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ties and other service providers to satisfy mandatory renewable en-
ergy purchase obligations) and comprise a significant share of overall 
REC sales.3  
 Understandably, most scholarship on RECs has focused on their 
environmental promise—for example, promoting the development of 
green power sources or reducing quantities of air pollution.4 But the 
relatively new emergence of RECs has caused scholars to overlook 
how they are situated within, and may have unanticipated effects on, 
the broader electricity marketplace.5 This Article provides the first 
substantive analysis of how REC markets might impact larger de-
bates over electricity restructuring. Analyzing the issue from a novel 
law-and-social-movements perspective, I contend that voluntary REC 
sales offer a unique opportunity for external market participants to 
get a “foot in the door” within otherwise closed monopoly states. 
From there, they can build up political influence (and a consumer 
base) that will allow them a more realistic chance of influencing the 
insular state regulatory bodies which largely control the restructur-
ing agenda. 
 This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the idea of 
applying the literature on social movements to the business and eco-
nomic sector (here, electricity markets). Social movement literature 
has traditionally focused on issues like abortion, gay marriage, or 
environmentalism; applying these tools to debates over regulated in-
                                                                                                                  
 3. See JENNY HEETER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, TECH. REP., NREL/TP-6A20-
56128, MARKET BRIEF: STATUS OF THE VOLUNTARY RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATE 
MARKET (2011 DATA) 4-6 (2012), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/56128.pdf 
(estimating a roughly 20% increase in voluntary REC sales between 2010 and 2011); Lori 
Bird & Elizabeth Lokey, Interaction of Compliance and Voluntary Renewable Energy 
Markets, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 18, 19 (pegging the voluntary REC market as 
comprising approximately 20% of all REC sales with a 35% annual growth rate); Michael 
Gillenwater, Redefining RECs—Part 1: Untangling Attributes and Offsets, 36 ENERGY 
POL’Y 2109, 2111 (2008) (“The voluntary purchase of RECs accounted for 46 percent of US 
consumer green power sales in 2005, and REC markets are growing faster than other 
segments of green power markets.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Magali A. Delmas & Maria J. Montes-Sancho, U.S. State Policies for 
Renewable Energy: Context and Effectiveness, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 2273 (2011); Jesse 
Glickstein, Comment, New York’s Proposed Solar Renewable Energy Market: Lessons 
Learned from Other States’ SREC Markets and Recommendations in Moving Forward, 30 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1248 (2013); Matthew McDonnell et al., The Potential and Power of 
Renewable Energy Credits to Enhance Air Quality and Economic Development in Arizona, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 809-11 (2011). In addition, most scholarship on RECs has focused on 
a particular subset of the market—their use in complying with state-mandated Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) (the compliance market). This overlooks the function of the 
voluntary market in purchasing RECs—in which end-user consumers elect to purchase 
RECs to offset some or all of the portion of their electricity supply that comes from non-
renewable sources. See infra Part II.A. 
 5. Cf. Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 
46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“It is one of the most important—and unspoken—
paradoxes of the modern American regulatory state: Energy law and environmental law 
rarely, if ever, merge.”). 
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dustries is decidedly less common. Yet a social movement approach 
can provide useful insights on seemingly standard firm behavior—
pressing for regulatory reform and even marketing products to con-
sumers—and doing so illuminates otherwise unappreciated elements 
in the development of energy market regulation. Energy market par-
ticipants behave like social movement actors in seeking to manage 
and influence surrounding stakeholders and parties as a means of 
accessing and altering political and regulatory structures. Several 
critical moments in the history of electricity regulation—the initial 
move (at the turn of the century) towards a monopoly model of elec-
tricity regulation, the later challenges to that model (beginning in the 
1970s), and the retrenchment of the monopolies (following the Enron 
collapse)—were significantly influenced by, and in large part enacted 
through, social movement processes. 
 Part II discusses Renewable Energy Credits—the “clean” in “clean 
electricity.” Though RECs are traded in two primary markets, legal 
scholarship to date has focused entirely on one—the “compliance” 
market whereby RECs are purchased by utilities to meet state-
mandated Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). This Article is the 
first full law review article to substantially address the second, “vol-
untary,” REC market.6 In the voluntary market, individual consum-
ers buy RECs to offset some or all of their “dirty” power usage. This 
Part introduces the mechanics of this market, as well as some of the 
unique policy dilemmas posed by voluntary REC sales. It then pro-
ceeds to situate REC regulation within the division of state and fed-
eral responsibility that characterizes the electricity market generally. 
Voluntary RECs are uniquely positioned, as they are neither the 
clear domain of state or federal regulatory bodies. Although volun-
tary REC sales are almost always interstate, the federal government 
has largely disclaimed any responsibility over them (save generic 
consumer protection standards administered through the FTC). And 
while states have robustly regulated the REC compliance market 
(which makes sense, given that these markets are created through 
state regulatory mandates), there is a scarcity of rulemaking on vol-
untary REC sales. The Dormant Commerce Clause, moreover, signif-
icantly constrains the ability of state regulators to maintain a mo-
nopoly in the REC context akin to what is permissible in retail elec-
tricity distribution generally. 
 Finally, Part III explains why these characteristics of the volun-
tary REC market provide a unique opportunity to restart the debate 
over retail electricity competition in monopoly states. Electricity 
                                                                                                                  
 6. For other key resources on voluntary RECs, see Gillenwater, supra note 3, at 
2109; Kelly Crandall, Comment, Trust and the Green Consumer: The Fight for 
Accountability in Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 893 (2010). 
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competition has long struggled against the simple logistical fact that 
a natural monopoly—whoever controls the wires—stands between 
producers of power and their ultimate consumers. Voluntary RECs 
are unique in the energy marketplace in that they offer an opportuni-
ty for consumers, even in states that otherwise lack electricity com-
petition, to engage directly with the electricity marketplace. In short, 
through voluntary RECs foreign players in the electricity market can 
sell an “electricity product” (albeit not electricity itself) directly to 
consumers—even in monopoly states. 
 Voluntary REC sales do not alter who actually provides the cus-
tomer with electricity, nor do they logically mandate that such sales 
be permitted. But voluntary REC sales still can provide a boost to 
competitive forces by altering the political landscape of monopoly 
states. Even limited competition creates stakeholders who might fa-
vor broader liberalization of the marketplace and, by virtue of their 
new foothold in monopoly states, will be better positioned to advocate 
for reforms. Moreover, REC providers can seek to convert their con-
sumers into constituents—leveraging their interaction with their 
customer base to create grassroots momentum for other friendly re-
forms (either full competition or partial measures such as increased 
support for distributed generation). This mechanism—relatively 
small avenues of competition creating momentum for further liberal-
ization—has been a recurrent theme in the history of electricity mar-
ket deregulation. 
 To be clear, I am not taking a position on the policy merits of re-
tail electricity restructuring. This is a complicated issue under the 
best of circumstances, and it is compounded by the unique energy 
landscape of each of the fifty states which must ultimately decide—
one way or the other—whether to allow retail competition. Nor am I 
arguing that retail restructuring will necessarily have positive envi-
ronmental effects—this, too, is controversial and uncertain, and it 
may be that the regulated or deregulated structure of the market has 
little ultimate effect on environmental outcomes.7 This Article is ra-
ther descriptive in nature: the voluntary REC market offers the op-
portunity for greater competition within the electricity sector regard-
less of whether state utility commissions want it or not, and that in 
                                                                                                                  
 7. See, e.g., M.K. Heiman, Expectations for Renewable Energy Under Market 
Restructuring: The U.S. Experience, 31 ENERGY 1052, 1058-61 (2006) (noting that there 
appears to be little pattern to regulated and deregulated states’ approaches in promoting 
renewable energy consumption); Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, The Environmental 
Impacts of Electricity Restructuring: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 1  
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 171, 203 (2006) (“The lessons from our experience with 
restructuring to date . . . suggest that other factors affecting the electricity sector may have 
bigger effects on the environment and on electricity consumers than the move to 
competition.”). 
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turn provides an opening for pro-competition entities to gain a foot-
hold and press the case in otherwise inhospitable terrain. 
II.  ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING AS SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 The “social movement” as a concept in law and social sciences, 
rarely is applied to a field as seemingly staid and buttoned-up as the 
energy sector. Yet, in the context of many important developments in 
electricity market regulation, a social movement approach provides 
important insights. As will be explained in more depth below, the de-
velopment of electricity market regulation has long been character-
ized by competing stakeholders who sought to form and reform this 
regulatory structure to suit their discrete interests. One of the more 
stark manifestations of this social conflict was the debate over elec-
tricity restructuring—whether to abandon the protected electricity 
monopoly and instead introduce market-based competition. This de-
bate, which played out across nearly every state as well as the feder-
al government, pitted several large institutional players against each 
other—including federal and state agencies, insurgent electricity 
suppliers, and incumbent monopolies. 
 The cluster of energy market participants who favor restructuring 
retail markets—changing the way that the electricity market func-
tions in a manner which would inevitably alter the distribution of the 
fruits of that market—represents a social movement. Their oppo-
nents in the electricity sector (incumbent monopolies, certain utility 
commissions, etc.) in turn comprise the “countermovement.”8 Think-
ing of the restructuring debate in social movement terms helps illu-
minate how the comparatively minor arena of REC sales can alter 
the relevant political dynamics of the electricity restructuring debate 
more generally. 
A.  Social Movements Analysis and Firm Behavior 
 When we hear about “social movements,” we tend to think about 
hot-button social issues such as gay rights, the environment, or abor-
tion.9 Few scholars have attempted to apply social movement insights 
                                                                                                                  
 8. See Mayer N. Zald & Bert Useem, Movement and Countermovement Interaction: 
Mobilization, Tactics, and State Involvement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 247, 247-48 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987) 
(“[M]ovements of any visibility and impact create the conditions for the mobilization of 
countermovements. By advocating change, by attacking the established interests, by 
mobilizing symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide 
opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and 
issues.”); David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and the 
Structure of Political Opportunity, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1628, 1630 (1996) (“Any social movement 
of potential political significance will generate opposition.”). 
 9. See, e.g., DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN 
INTRODUCTION 1-2 (2009) (tracing the genesis of the research into social movements to 
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to business and economic disputes (at least without a traditional pro-
gressive hook, as in labor or environmental disputes, wherein the 
business is typically cast as the antagonist). Scholars sometimes spe-
cifically separate out “economic” and “social” actors, with “social 
movements” being a component of the latter set.10 After all, economic 
motives can easily explain why firms expend effort to persuade poli-
cymakers to alter regulatory structures (not to mention why they try 
to persuade consumers to purchase their offerings).11 Hence, it is un-
surprising that social movement theory initially grew out of a desire 
to explain mass action in contexts such as the environmental move-
ment, where there were no obvious incentives for coordination.12 
 But while perhaps the “why” of business behavior is not illumi-
nated by social movement literature, the “how” certainly is. There is, 
after all, more than one way to turn a profit—indeed, one of the 
hallmarks of the modern capitalist system is that it nuzzles out profit 
opportunities regardless of how the regulatory system is contoured. 
Self-interest can take us only so far in determining why the opportu-
nities proffered by certain regulatory structures are preferred over 
others and why particular economic opportunities are recognized and 
pursued (or overlooked and dismissed) in particular social contexts.13 
Moreover, noting the obvious truth that firms want favorable policies 
or friendly consumers does little to explain how they succeed in bring-
ing that state of affairs into existence. Social movement behavior 
                                                                                                                  
radical protests in the late 1960s); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1323, 1328 n.13 (2006) (collecting articles devoted to “the role of social movements in 
constitutional change”). I am as guilty of this sin as any in my own social movement 
related scholarship, which has primarily focused on issues of race and sexual orientation. 
See, e.g., David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249 (2013) [hereinafter 
Schraub, Sticky Slopes]; David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 187. 
 10. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and 
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (distinguishing between the “economic” 
and “social” spheres of public life and stating that “[s]ocial movements belong to this 
[social] sphere of society”). 
 11. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the 
Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 352 
(2002) (“There is nothing cynical about treating the owner of a business, or a consumer 
buying artichokes, as trying to maximize his material self-interest. . . . [Both] would 
cheerfully agree that they are self-interest maximizing.”). 
 12. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that the environmentalism movement “was 
remarkable for the diffuse and remote character of the concerns that animated its 
participants, for the lack of any particularized economic interests in its basic goals, and for 
the sophisticated organizational efforts that sustained it”). 
 13. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 346 (arguing against an “ahistorical” public choice 
theory and contending that social actors are motivated by “intersubjective understandings 
[that] are heavily dependent on temporally specific attitudes and the evolution of ideas 
from one generation to the next”); id. at 351 (noting the importance of “agenda-setting” as 
the “pre-empirical and generally pre-analytic” set of decisions that govern how social actors 
determine “where [they] will go and what [they] will look for”). 
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bridges the gap between the desire of firms to alter economic or regu-
latory climates and actually effectuating the change.  
 In this vein, a growing body of literature explores the intersection 
of social movements and business behavior.14 Business organizations 
“are strategic actors, intent on maintaining their social position and 
influencing their environment.”15 Threats from opposing social 
groups—for example, a consumer boycott—can challenge “an organi-
zation’s field position, undermining the ‘existing relationships and 
meanings and order’ by which that position is defined.”16 Consequent-
ly, firms have no choice but to participate in the field of social move-
ment activity in order to preserve and expand their economic  
opportunities.  
 As Brayden King and Mary-Hunter McDonnell note, articles ex-
ploring the intersection of social movements and business practice 
typically focus “only on direct responses such as wins or losses, re-
sistance or concession.”17 We know something about the outcomes of 
social movement/business interaction but very little about the pro-
cesses through which these interactions take place. And even schol-
ars who are interrogating the “how” question usually start with the 
presumption that social movements and firms are oppositional and 
proceed to explore how businesses strategically manage the threats 
posed by social movement activism. For example, firms might engage 
in prosocial behavior to burnish their image in response to a consum-
er boycott.18 In certain situations, firms may even align or sponsor a 
social movement boycott targeted at certain practices in order to 
head off more radical critiques of their own behavior.19 
 In other words, while this literature has examined how firms re-
spond to social movements, and occasionally looks to their participa-
tion in social movements, it has not yet identified the firm as a social 
                                                                                                                  
 14. See, e.g., Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden King, Keeping up Appearances: 
Reputational Threat and Impression Management After Social Movement Boycotts, 58 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 387 (2013); Edward T. Walker & Christopher M. Rea, The Political 
Mobilization of Firms and Industries, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 281 (2014); Mary-Hunter 
McDonnell, If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them: Corporate Sponsorship of Social 
Movement Boycotts (Aug. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2137371. 
 15. McDonnell & King, supra note 14, at 388. 
 16. Id. (quoting Neil Fligstein & Doug McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic 
Action Fields, 29 SOC. THEORY 1, 5 (2011)). 
 17. Id. (citing Brayden G. King, A Political Mediation Model of Corporate Response to 
Social Movement Activism, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 395 (2008)); see also Joseph E. Luders, The 
Economics of Movement Success: Business Responses to Civil Rights Mobilization, 111 AM. 
J. SOC. 963, 964 (2006); Rachel Schurman, Fighting “Frankenfoods”: Industry Opportunity 
Structures and the Efficacy of the Anti-Biotech Movement in Western Europe, 51 SOC. 
PROBS. 243 (2004). 
 18. See McDonnell & King, supra note 14, at 388-89. 
 19. See id. at 389. 
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movement. That is to say, run-of-the-mill industry behavior—
lobbying to alter regulatory climates or deciding to introduce new 
market products—has not typically been characterized in social 
movement terms. Yet there is no principled reason for this gap.20 So-
cial movements can encompass all sorts of ends—they represent 
nothing more than “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
which represents preferences for changing some elements of the so-
cial structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”21 Social move-
ments are a species of social conflict wherein opposing actors engage, 
negotiate, or fight to control particular social resources.22 The day-to-
day ends of a business—protecting and enhancing market share, 
identifying and exploiting economic opportunities—certainly qualify 
as among the sort of resources social actors will fight to attain. Social 
movement analysis can thereby provide novel modes of identifying 
and analyzing avenues of change relevant to firms. 
 The social movement perspective offers assistance in identifying 
productive firm behavior in three ways. First, it broadens who is con-
sidered to be a relevant player in producing the sorts of changes de-
sired by economic actors. Political and economic change is multidirec-
tional; it emerges from a multitude of different sources both near and 
far from the immediate point of controversy.23 The relationship be-
tween a movement and the political or social structures it seeks to 
influence is not hermetically sealed off from surrounding society—
social movements influence and are influenced by forces which on 
their face appear to be entirely external to the competing combat-
ants. Seemingly unrelated social forces or unengaged political actors 
can have profound impacts on the success or failure of the movement’s 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See, e.g., Neil Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to 
Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 657 (1996) (identifying firms as social 
movement actors engaged in an attempt to control the relevant market place). 
 21. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: 
A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1217-18 (1977).  
 22. See Alain Touraine, An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements, 52 SOC. 
RES. 749, 750-51 (1985) (identifying social movements as a special sort of social conflict and 
arguing that a “conflict presupposes a clear definition of opponents or competiting [sic] 
actors and of the resources they are fighting for or negotiating to take control of”). 
 23. Sometimes the social movement dynamic is described as “bidirectional ” in that 
while the effects of social movement lobbying influence politics, political dynamics also 
impact the internal structure and preferences of social movement actors. See Cary 
Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the 
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 86 (2001) (noting that “law reform efforts 
themselves may have an impact on public opinion, with action by courts and other legal 
institutions sometimes lending legitimacy to the claims advanced by social movements”). I 
prefer “multidirectional” to emphasize how even entities that are not directly implicated in 
the movement or regulatory structure can have outsized impacts on the development of 
social change. 
946  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:937 
 
agenda. These dynamics are as relevant to the sorts of social devel-
opments sought by businesses as they are to those pursued by more 
traditional movements. 
 The social movement literature (as the name implies) generally 
views all of society as its canvas. This is a broader outlook than one 
typically finds in the economic context, which focuses on those enti-
ties whose direct financial or institutional stakes in the relevant in-
dustry give them straightforward, rational incentives to act.24 So 
while an economic account of electricity regulation might focus on the 
utility companies or federal and state regulatory commissions, it 
would likely pay little attention to, say, the travails of a local trolley 
car franchise25 or trends in economic theorizing.26 But even in rela-
tively arcane and highly regulated contexts, the development and 
alteration of regulatory structures involves much more than big com-
panies lobbying big agencies in a void.27 Often times, it is precisely 
these seemingly external and unrelated social players that play an 
outsized influence in how social change progresses. 
 To understand the manner in which “unaffiliated” actors can af-
fect the course of social reform, consider accounts about how social 
movement victories can act to “mobilize” supporters (or “countermo-
bilize” opponents). The traditional form of this story  
assumes a simple bifurcation between the supporters and oppo-
nents of [the policy], with a substantial chunk of the population 
indifferent and on the sidelines. A major victory by the supporters 
of [the policy] mobilizes its opponents, who see their interests or 
values threatened, but it does not affect those who had no opinion 
on the matter in the first place 28  
But it is evident that this divide does not always hold—a social 
movement victory can alter the relevant political coalitions entirely, 
for example, by “threatening the[] discrete and previously unaffected 
interests” of hitherto neutral groups.29 Likewise, it can add support-
ers if the victory creates new bonds of affinity or interest that link 
together groups previously disconnected from the relevant social con-
                                                                                                                  
 24. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 310-11 (noting the assumption of public choice 
theorists that behavior emerges from rational actors seeking to maximize their self-
interest). 
 25. See infra notes 55-58. 
 26. See infra notes 71-74. 
 27. See Walker & Rea, supra note 14, at 293 (“[T]he politics of business need not be 
confined to explicit attempts to elect sympathetic candidates or facilitate the work of 
friendly legislators. Business may also act as an activist and an issue entrepreneur, with 
clear economic interests but, to that end, with a clear focus on developing political and 
ideological support of its policy positions.”) (citation omitted). 
 28. Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1259. 
 29. Id. at 1259-60. 
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troversy. In this way, analyzing social movement reform prospects 
requires keen attention not just to engaged players or even those 
with obviously relevant but currently “inactive” interests.30 “Neigh-
boring” social spaces31 also can play an important role in social 
movement prospects where particular reform paths create the oppor-
tunity to mobilize parties which might otherwise be disinterested. 
 Nor should this analysis restrict itself solely to traditional political 
developments. Technological and economic changes, too, can shift 
relevant social movement dynamics and create new opportunities for 
coalition-building and political lobbying.32 Jack Balkin and Reva 
Siegel use the example of copyright in the internet age—
technological innovations sharpened the tension between intellectual 
property rights and First Amendment protections, and stakeholders 
on both sides mobilized to promote different regulatory theories pro-
tective of their interests (and, I would add, exploit the regulatory la-
cunae that became apparent as the technological landscape outpaced 
formal governing laws and policies).33 
 Second, a social movement perspective gives insight into the pro-
cesses by which firm behavior is altered by surrounding social cli-
mates. The move to the regulated-monopoly model of electricity regu-
lation in the early twentieth century, for example, profoundly influ-
enced how electricity utilities were perceived by the public (partners 
in a shared enterprise of prosperity rather than rapacious robber 
barons); it also had the not-unintentional effect of locking the then-
dominant electricity providers into a privileged (and near-
unassailable) economic position.34 And the reforms need not be so ob-
viously stark to have outsized impacts. Seemingly small changes in a 
political, economic, or regulatory structure can have big effects if they 
                                                                                                                  
 30. ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY 
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 156 (2008) (noting the importance of the “potential preferences of 
constituents who could become active and attentive if provoked”). 
 31. “Neighboring,” in this context, means a social entity that is not directly implicated 
in the controversy but nonetheless maintains significant connections to the participants. 
For example, in the desegregation context, advocates of community schooling would be a 
neighboring space—they did not have an inherent stake in the debate but their interests 
were variously implicated by either side as the desegregation movement progressed. See 
Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1260 & n.40. In the electricity restructuring 
context, examples of potential neighboring spaces might include land use advocates, solar 
panel manufacturers, or industrial trade organizations. 
 32. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 933 (2006) (“[T]echnological and economic changes produce political 
contestation and social movement organization that in turn mediate the significance of 
such changes in the legal system.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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alter (for example) which groups have access to consumers, regula-
tors, and other important stakeholders.35 
 Social movements, of course, are constantly crafting changes both 
large and small in the communities they operate in. These changes 
create new political and economic opportunities that can destabilize 
even longstanding social arrangements. In their study of the devel-
opment of the American wind energy market, Wesley Sine and Bran-
don Lee identify several means by which social movement activity 
can create or promote new entrepreneurial opportunities. First, it can 
disrupt traditional institutional arrangements, creating space for 
new entrants.36 Second, it can alter the values favored by regulators, 
“creating supportive contexts for new types of entrepreneurial activi-
ty.”37 Third, it can reduce the costs of identifying and mobilizing 
around new opportunities by elevating the salience of hitherto unrec-
ognized opportunities.38 Each of these dynamics can be observed over 
the course of the history of electricity regulation.  
 For example, the burgeoning environmental movement spurred 
the passage of PURPA as a means of enabling small, more sustaina-
ble generators into the electricity market. This development had the 
unexpected side effect of cracking open the generation sector and in 
doing so, falsified the long-standing presumption that large genera-
tion projects (of the sort that could only be launched by a state-
guaranteed monopoly) were the most cost-effective means of produc-
ing power.39 Likewise, the “trend” of deregulation—which by the 
1970s had become a popular slogan of reform for both consumer ad-
vocates and economic theorists—played an important role in chang-
ing how an important regulatory actor (FERC) assessed its stance 
vis-à-vis the electricity industry.40 Part IV will suggest that one rea-
son the growing voluntary REC market might help renew the push 
for electricity competition is that it provides a means for foreign en-
trants to get a “foot in the door” in otherwise closed marketplaces, 
giving them a foothold from which they can more effectively lobby 
policymakers and constituents.41 
                                                                                                                  
 35. Cf. Amy Hillman & Gerald Keim, International Variation in the Business-
Government Interface: Institutional and Organizational Considerations, 20 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 193, 212 (1995) (noting the range of formal and informal constraints which effect how 
businesses interface with regulators and policymakers). 
 36. See Wesley D. Sine & Brandon H. Lee, Tilting at Windmills? The Environmental 
Movement and the Emergence of the U.S. Wind Energy Sector, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 123, 124 
(2009). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id.  
 39. See infra notes 64-70. 
 40. See infra notes 71-74. 
 41. See infra Part III. 
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 Third, the social movement account recognizes and explores how 
firms affirmatively shape attitudes and create support for their pre-
ferred structures. Companies are “actively engaged in the production 
and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and by-
standers or observers,” “framing” events or activities to carry friend-
ly, amenable meanings.42 Creative entrepreneurs find ways to link 
discrete interests of unaffiliated groups to previously irrelevant poli-
cy debates or create bonds of affinity that cause the group to consider 
itself an ally of the entrepreneur’s project. Companies regularly seek 
to develop these relationships with their consumers, through ad 
campaigns, marketing, and other activities designed to create a sense 
of kinship and social bond.43 Much of the instinct behind corporate 
leveraging of “grassroots” (or grassroots-like) social mobilization lies 
precisely in the fact that it is perceived as less obviously self-
interested than pure corporate lobbying.44 
 Again, this opportunity for firms to construct favorable conditions 
for pursuing their economic agenda resonates with the story I will 
tell in Part IV. The voluntary REC market has the potential to give 
foreign firms unprecedented access to consumers in monopoly states. 
And the context of that access could not be more pro-social: Environ-
mentalism! Responsible consumption! Saving the planet! This access 
can be leveraged to create positive relationships with the broader 
electricity consumption community, and that in turn can significantly 
alter the political terrain faced by state utility commissioners who 
would otherwise face little countervailing pressure to that exerted by 
the incumbent monopolies. 
 In short, the social movements approach allows for a society-wide 
lens, even in seemingly narrow and esoteric contexts. In terms of spe-
cific firm behaviors, it looks to how companies respond to newly cre-
ated opportunities that emerge when preexisting political, social, or 
economic arrangements are reshuffled; it also recognizes and ex-
plores how firms create these alterations to promote amenable 
change. These insights will form the locus of the story, told in Part 
IV, of how voluntary REC sales could have an outsized impact on re-
tail electricity restructuring debates. Before turning to that, however, 
it is useful to briefly explore the prior history of electricity market 
competition from inside this social movement lens. 
                                                                                                                  
 42. Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: 
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 613 (2000); see McDonnell & King, 
supra note 14, at 389 (“Organizations rely on the approval of relevant others, or ‘target 
audiences,’ to obtain needed resources and survive. As part of their ongoing impression 
management efforts, organizations make claims and engage in performances that cultivate 
positive perceptions among these audiences.”) (citations omitted). 
 43. See infra Part III.B. 
 44. See Walker & Rea, supra note 14, at 292-93. 
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B.  Electricity Monopolies and Electricity Restructuring:  
Three Vignettes 
 Even compared against other elements of the modern administra-
tive state, electricity markets are governed by an unusually complex 
regulatory structure. A full account of this history has been done 
with great thoroughness elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this 
Article.45 Here, I provide three short vignettes from critical moments 
in the history of electricity regulation that help demonstrate the use-
fulness of the social movements perspective. Viewing these develop-
ments—the origins of the electricity monopoly, the emergent chal-
lenge by competition advocates to that model, and the eventual 
stalling of restructuring efforts—from a social movement lens illumi-
nates how even seemingly pure economic decisions are impacted by 
sociological considerations. This characteristic will become critical in 
understanding the outsized role REC trading may play in pushing 
the restructuring debate forward in the coming years. 
 1.  The Development of Energy Monopolies 
 In its first few decades, electricity production and sales were 
largely unregulated.46 Competition thrived as a multitude of new 
firms sought to gain market share over the terra nova of the electrici-
ty marketplace. By the 1920s, however, the electricity market quickly 
began to consolidate, as technology allowed greater levels of energy 
production and firms started to take advantage of economies of 
scale.47 Starting at the turn of the twentieth century, farsighted elec-
tricity executives saw the benefits of removing their industry from 
the unbridled free market and instead ensconcing themselves as pub-
licly regulated industries. 
 Electricity seemed to be the quintessential example of a natural 
monopoly.48 Effective competition between firms would require the 
creation of multiple redundant and inefficient power transmission 
and distribution systems. As early as 1898, electricity mogul Samuel 
Insull warned against the ruinous effects of electricity competition 
and urged the creation of publicly regulated electricity monopolies 
                                                                                                                  
 45. For a more thorough discussion, see generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: 
THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY 
SYSTEM (1999); Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government 
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827 (1998). 
 46. See Tomain, supra note 45, at 830. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION 1 (1999) 
(defining a natural monopoly as where the “entire demand within a relevant market can be 
satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more”). 
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with exclusive franchise areas.49 This proposal evolved into the idea 
of a “regulatory compact” whereby the government “would set the 
rates that the monopoly could charge and would allow (as opposed to 
‘guarantee’) the utility to earn a reasonable return on its prudent 
capital investment.”50 
 The regulatory compact had several things going for it as a policy 
matter. From a regulatory perspective, this model recognized the 
utilities’ natural monopoly while guarding against discriminatory 
practices or exploitative pricing.51 From a social standpoint, the com-
pact was a quintessential example of progressive-era regulation, 
“built on principles of scientific management and regulation by ex-
perts” rather than easily swayed (and bought) legislators.52 From the 
vantage of the utility industry, state regulation gave them a guaran-
teed customer base and locked in the existing industry structure in 
which the incumbent monopolies were dominant.53 Judicial decisions 
which protected the utilities’ right to a reasonable return on their 
investment provided further reason for utilities to support this regu-
latory structure.54 
 Nonetheless, it was not impossible to imagine the regulatory com-
pact meeting stiff political opposition. How the public perceived the 
compact depended, in large part, on how it was framed.55 One could 
                                                                                                                  
 49. See Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate 
(Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 46 (2005) 
(“Insull argued that the entire industry had been held back by wasteful competition that 
‘frightens the investor, and compels corporations to pay a very high price for capital.’ 
According to Insull, the best service at the lowest possible cost could only be obtained 
through a monopoly provider that had an exclusive geographic franchise.”) (footnote 
omitted).  
 50. Tomain, supra note 45, at 832. 
 51. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 26-27. 
 52. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 
1640 (2014) (noting that these laws generally provided for wide regulatory mandates and 
independent management by area experts). 
 53. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 27-29; see also Boyd, supra note 52, at 1643 (noting that 
the rate and franchise guarantees also allowed utilities to favorably access capital markets 
necessary for investment in electricity infrastructure). 
 54. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) 
(“The rate-making process . . . involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer 
interests. . . . From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be 
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the 
business.”); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) (holding, in the railroad context, “that 
the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation 
maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property 
being used by it for the convenience of the public”). 
 55. See Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 9, at 1309 (“Framing theory . . . argues that 
social movements are not simply responding to pre-existing dynamics necessarily flowing 
from particular institutional or social arrangements. Rather, they are in the business of 
creating and manipulating what social facts mean in the context of their constituencies, 
their opponents, and the surrounding polity.”) (footnote omitted). 
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present the relationship as protecting industry and consumer alike 
from the debilitating effects of voracious, unrestrained competition. 
But one could also portray it as naked protectionism for entrenched 
robber barons who could easily capture the commissions that were 
supposedly “policing” them. The latter possibility was not theoretical 
and turned primarily on how the public perceived the relevant actors 
and their behavior. Insull had, as a cautionary tale, the case of Chi-
cago street-car magnate Charles Yerkes. Yerkes had also attempted 
to convert his empire into a similar publicly regulated monopoly, but 
he was stymied due, in large part, to the fact that he was reviled by 
most of his customers.56  
 Insull was determined not to meet the same fate. He launched an 
expansive campaign to ensure that electricity consumers saw public 
utilities as allies rather than adversaries. This included a popular 
“consumer ownership” model which sold stock to electricity customers 
as well as aggressive promotion of the sale of electric appliances and 
gadgets for home use.57 Placing electricity utilities under the ambit of 
state regulatory commissions was presented as part of a larger public 
framing in which the utilities and consumers were on the same side. 
 In short, while the monopoly model of electricity regulation could 
be explained in terms of self-interest (of the regulators and of the 
utilities), this does not alter the fact that this arrangement was not a 
foregone conclusion. It needed to be sold to the public, and the sale 
needed to successfully construct the creation of an electricity monopo-
ly as in the best interest of industry and public alike. Insull’s cam-
paigns “select[ed] some aspects of a perceived reality”—namely, those 
elements which drew together industry and consumer—“and ma[d]e 
them more salient” as a means of constructing the social understand-
ing of Insull’s reform efforts.58 And unlike Yerkes, Insull was quite 
successful: while his empire collapsed during the Great Depression, 
the regulatory compact model he forged endured for decades  
thereafter. 
 2.  PURPA and the Push Towards Deregulation 
 The regulatory compact was based off a perceived unity of inter-
ests between the electricity industry and electricity consumers. Both 
favored significant expansion of the availability of plentiful and 
cheap electricity. Electricity utilities, of course, wanted to expand 
their customer base (and sell more power to them), and electricity 
consumers had bought into the notion that more power equaled a 
                                                                                                                  
 56. See Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 49, at 47-48. 
 57. See id. at 52-53. 
 58. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 
J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993). 
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greater quality of life. Technological innovation and increased electri-
fication allowed for more electricity to be produced and consumed at 
lower prices.  
 This accord, successful through the middle of the twentieth centu-
ry, began to be challenged in the 1960s and 1970s. The first challenge 
was a “plateau” in the electricity market which unsettled the as-
sumptions that had provided for steady utility profits in the preced-
ing decades.59 As rates of consumption and technological innovation 
both stalled, utilities could no longer obtain the stable rates of return 
that they had previously enjoyed. This problem was exacerbated by 
perverse incentives created by the regulatory compact—because utili-
ties were generally entitled to recover their “costs” (plus a reasonable 
profit), utilities were encouraged to overinvest in capital improve-
ments, overbuilding supply and otherwise increasing prices.60 While 
nominally the requirement that recovered costs be “prudently” in-
curred could have provided a check on overexpansion, functionally 
commissions were reluctant to second-guess business management 
decisions by regulated utilities.61 
 The burgeoning environmental movement also destabilized the 
perception of everyday consumers and electricity utilities as natural 
allies. Increased electricity production did not only mean cheaper 
prices and better gadgets; it also entailed greater pollution and sig-
nificant environmental challenges.62 Moreover, environmentally con-
scious consumers did not necessarily favor the (high-pollutions) types 
of energy resources utilized by the incumbent monopolies.63 The 
emergent gap between consumer preferences and utility practices 
imperiled the incumbents’ historic political dominance in setting elec-
tricity policy. 
                                                                                                                  
 59. Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 
435, 450 (2002) (“Starting roughly in 1965, the industry reached technological and 
financial plateaus at which industry expansion slowed considerably; economies of scale 
were not being realized, costs were increasing, generation was overbuilt, and alternative 
providers were coming into the market.”). 
 60. See id. 
 61. FERC has articulated a presumption of prudence which recognizes “that 
managers of a utility have broad discretion in conducting their business affairs and in 
incurring costs necessary to provide services to their customers.” New England Power Co., 
31 FERC ¶ 61,047, 61,084 (1985). The prudence test looks to whether the incurred costs 
are those which “a reasonable utility management . . . would have made, in good faith, 
under the same circumstances, and at the relevant point in time.” Id. Even if “in hindsight 
it may be clear that a management decision was wrong,” prudence is measured “based on 
the particular circumstances existing either at the time the challenged costs were actually 
incurred, or the time the utility became committed to incur those expenses.” Id. 
 62. See Sine & Lee, supra note 38, at 131 (noting the increase in attention 
environmental groups began to give to energy issues). 
 63. See id. at 126. 
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 The key development in this story is the passage of the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978.64 Designed to in-
crease efficiency and remedy certain defects in the electricity regula-
tory regime, PURPA contained a seemingly unassuming provision 
enabling certain “Qualifying Facilities” (QFs) to effectively enter the 
electricity marketplace by requiring electric utilities to purchase 
their power.65 PURPA defined a QF as either a cogeneration facility 
(a facility which produces “steam or forms of useful energy (such as 
heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling 
purposes” alongside its electric energy production),66 or “small power 
production facilit[ies]” producing no more than 80 megawatts of en-
ergy through the use of renewable or other environmentally friendly 
resources.67 Specifically, FERC interpreted PURPA as requiring that 
utilities purchase power from QFs at their full-avoided cost—that is, 
the cost the utility would have paid had it generated the electricity 
itself (or purchased from another source).68  
 PURPA created an opportunity for small generators to compete so 
long as they could produce energy for less than the big utilities’ 
avoided cost rates. The old assumption was that this would be a rare 
occurrence—economies of scale would give big generators an insur-
mountable advantage in price. “What surprised everyone was how 
much new nonutility generated electricity was available and how ea-
ger independent power producers (IPPs) were to enter the market.”69 
As it turned out, QFs could consistently produce power below the 
avoided cost of the monopoly generators, and thus they produced as 
much electricity as PURPA allowed.70 
                                                                                                                  
 64.  Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 16, 26, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C.). 
 65. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (2012); see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982) 
(observing that PURPA was passed in part because “traditional electricity utilities were 
reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power to, the nontraditional facilities”); 
Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 
ENERGY L.J. 419, 422 (1995) (noting that without a government mandate utilities “were 
reluctant to purchase power from their potential competitors” and on the occasions they did 
so “the prices they offered were not attractive”). 
 66. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (2012). 
 67. Id. at § 796(17)(A) (stating that a small power production facility must produce 
“electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable 
resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof”). 
 68. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (2014); Cudahy, supra note 65, at 422 (“The price of 
PURPA power, as prescribed by statute and interpreted by regulation, was full-avoided 
cost, or the cost to a utility of generating the same energy or purchasing it from another 
source.”); see also Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983) 
(upholding FERC’s full-avoided cost rates and interconnection requirements under 
PURPA). 
 69. Tomain, supra note 59, at 451-52. 
 70. Id. at 452. 
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 From a social movement perspective, there are two critical lessons 
to be drawn from PURPA’s success. The first is straightforward: new 
economic developments (the energy “plateau”), combined with a dis-
ruptive social movement (environmentalism), created a novel oppor-
tunity within a previously closed socio-economic institution (energy 
markets). In stark contrast to the old model, which envisioned high-
capacity (and normally high-polluting) power generators that could 
only be built by large (and governmentally protected) utilities, 
PURPA was geared towards small-scale, sustainable generation. The 
second lesson is more subtle but perhaps more important: the rele-
vant provision of PURPA was not, at the time, seen as a major re-
form. It was not perceived as the first step in a radical restructuring 
of the energy sector. PURPA’s significance was that it created a foot-
hold for new energy stakeholders—ones more attuned to the new 
problems and public understandings surrounding energy—to enter 
into the market. 
 The success of PURPA spurred a larger rethinking of the electrici-
ty market and the possibility of greater competition.71 A seemingly 
unlikely alliance of consumer advocates like Ralph Nader and Chica-
go-school economists had already begun presenting deregulation as 
an exciting, even trendy, means of reinvigorating hidebound regulat-
ed industries.72 Instead of viewing the regulatory compact as a pub-
lic-spirited endeavor to ensure that all relevant electricity stakehold-
ers were treated fairly, critics cast the monopoly as an example of 
regulatory capture.73 FERC soon began exploring the possibility of 
“restructuring” the industry to further push it away from a pure mo-
nopoly model, and it rapidly “became probably the most consistent 
and important administrative agency in promoting the transition to” 
competitive, deregulated markets.74 
                                                                                                                  
 71. See id. at 453-54; HIRSH, supra note 45, at 119 (“Through its mostly unintended 
consequences, PURPA inaugurated the process by which the traditional structure of the 
utility system disintegrated.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle 
Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 883-87 (1973); Symposium, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 
573 (1975) (symposium devoted to the possibility of deregulating the airline industry); 
Harry M. Trebing, The Chicago School Versus Public Utility Regulation, 10 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 97, 97-98 (1976). Cf. Sine & Lee, supra note 38, at 124 (noting the ability of social 
movements to “embed their values into the regulatory structure, creating supportive 
contexts for new types of entrepreneurial activity”). 
 73. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 3 (1963) (“It is business control over politics (and by 
‘business’ I mean the major economic interests) rather than political regulation of the 
economy that is the significant phenomenon of the Progressive Era.”); Boyd, supra note 52, 
at 1652 (observing that, for Chicago-school economists, “[p]ublic utility regulation was . . . a 
product of rent-seeking behavior on the part of regulated firms; the idea of a general public 
interest was tenuous at best”). 
 74. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1367 (1998). 
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 As William Boyd observes, the arguments against the utility’s 
regulated-monopoly status were not unknown prior to the 1960s and 
1970s, nor are they indisputably correct.75 Their influence derives 
from the particular social position that had emerged at this time pe-
riod, which allowed the utility monopoly to be reframed “as an exam-
ple of the endemic problems afflicting government regulation and the 
concomitant superiority of markets.”76 This critique had the tempo-
rally specific advantage of being able to pit a hypothetical free mar-
ket against all of the grubby day-to-day failings of the monopoly.77 
The pro-competition critique likely could not have gained traction if 
there were not some economic and experiential bases for it; but view-
ing the debate solely within those terms overlooks essential sociologi-
cal differences between the progressive-era dawn of the electricity 
sector (a novel and fast moving industry in a society fearful of over-
powered “robber barons”) and that which existed by mid-century (a 
matured industry facing technological stagnation and significant en-
vironmental challenges). 
 3.  Retail Competition: Competitive versus Monopoly States 
 PURPA’s move toward competition did not on its own spark a sim-
ilar restructuring across the electricity sector—at least not universal-
ly. Of the three main segments of the electricity market—generation, 
wholesale sales, and distribution—PURPA had effectively (if only 
partially) introduced competition into the first.78 Outside the genera-
tion context, QFs had only limited access to the market—they could 
sell to utilities at avoided-cost rates, but they had no means of access-
ing interstate transmission lines or selling to the ultimate retail con-
sumers. The natural next step was to deregulate the electricity 
transmission market. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 gave FERC gen-
eral authority to order transmission companies to allow other power 
companies to move power across their lines (known as “wheeling”).79 
                                                                                                                  
 75. See Boyd, supra note 52, at 1656-57. 
 76. Id. at 1656. 
 77. See id. at 1657 (“Of course, comparing an ideal view of markets to real-world 
regulation was never going to go in regulation’s favor . . . .”). 
 78. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 further advanced generation deregulation by 
making it easier for non-QFs to access the market, albeit without the strong subsidies 
provided by PURPA. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 
1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 
447, 467-74 (1993) (detailing the new category of “exempt wholesale generators” created by 
the Act). By 2001, non-utility generators accounted for 30% of all electricity generation. 
Tomain, supra note 59, at 469. 
 79. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.C.); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 
410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973) (defining wheeling as the “transfer by direct transmission or 
displacement electric power from one utility to another over the facilities of an 
intermediate utility”).  
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Whereas PURPA had permitted wheeling orders only where FERC 
“determines that such order would reasonably preserve existing com-
petitive relationships,”80 now FERC merely had to determine that 
such an order was “in the public interest” and complied with general 
requirements that the rates of service be “just and reasonable.”81 In 
1996, FERC published Order 888,82 which required interstate trans-
mission line operators to file a non-discriminatory tariff for use of 
their power lines. Further, the pricing and usage of the transmission 
lines had to be “unbundled” from other non-retail utility services, 
preventing self-dealing and other anti-competitive practices meant to 
favor the incumbent owners.83 Order 888 functionally deregulated the 
wholesale market, and today FERC generally “regulates” wholesale 
electricity rates by ensuring “the integrity of the interstate energy 
markets,” rather than through direct ratemaking proceedings.84 The 
last horizon for competition was sales to end-consumers, but FERC 
was still without jurisdiction to introduce competition into the retail 
sector.85 The Federal Power Act continued to delegate responsibility 
over that segment of the electricity market to the states, and the En-
ergy Policy Act of 1992 preserved state authority over retail wheel-
ing.86 This created new challenges for competition advocates, because 
thus far electricity restructuring had been promoted primarily at the 
federal level. At the state level the interest group dynamics sur-
rounding electricity restructuring became especially prominent.87 
 Some of these dynamics are quite straightforward. For example, 
there are wide disparities in the average electricity rates paid by con-
                                                                                                                  
 80. See Energy Policy Act § 721 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 824j). 
 81. 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (2012) (“[T]he Commission may issue such [a wheeling] order if 
it finds that such order meets the requirements of [16 U.S.C.] section 824k . . . and would 
otherwise be in the public interest.”); § 824k(a) (providing that wholesale transmission 
“rates, charges, terms, and conditions shall promote the economically efficient transmission 
and generation of electricity and shall be just and reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential”). 
 82. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pts. 35, 385). See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (upholding Order 888). 
 83. See New York, 535 U.S. at 11-12 (noting that Order 888 required the “ ‘functional 
unbundling’ of wholesale generation and transmission services” as well as unbundling 
retail transmission services where the transmission occurred in interstate commerce).  
 84. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 85. See 16 U.S.C. § 824k(g)-(h) (2012) (prohibiting any FERC order “inconsistent with 
[state] retail marketing areas” or which provides for “mandatory retail wheeling” to 
consumers). 
 86. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 244 (noting that under the Energy Policy Act “the 
federal government would not mandate retail wheeling, but states could”). 
 87. See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 423 (2005). 
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sumers across different states.88 Where electricity rates are low, an 
“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality may easily dominate the poli-
ty. Moreover, local investor-owned utilities also often oppose the cur-
tailment of their monopolies, as this would disturb their “comfortable 
life with a virtually guaranteed reasonable rate-of-return on invest-
ment.”89 But in addition to these concerns, state utility commissions 
had special reason to be suspicious of electricity restructuring—
adopting it would effectively cede much of their regulatory power to 
the federal government. 
 To understand why, it is necessary to quickly outline the basic 
structure of federal versus state authority in the electricity context. 
The Federal Power Act of 193590 split the regulatory responsibility for 
electricity into three components: generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution.91 States were responsible for regulating the actual genera-
tion of power.92 The Federal Power Commission—now the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—was granted jurisdiction 
over the interstate transmission of power and wholesale power 
sales.93 Finally, states retained jurisdiction over the local retail dis-
tribution of the power.94 The result was a regulatory “sandwich,” with 
states having authority over the beginning and end of the electricity 
life cycle and FERC obtaining jurisdiction over the middle. 
 This framework quickly ran into a technical problem. Electricity 
travels by physics, not by contract. In 1945, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the line of federal jurisdiction “was to follow the flow of 
electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic 
or governmental, test.”95 But because electricity flows do not follow 
political (or contractual) borders, there is almost no way to determine 
                                                                                                                  
 88. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation 
or Reregulation?, 23 REG. 46, 47 (2000). 
 89. Amy W. Ando & Karen L. Palmer, Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of 
State-Level Electricity Restructuring 8 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-19-REV, 
1998). 
 90. Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-334, 49 Stat. 863 (1935) (codified at 16  
U.S.C. § 791). 
 91. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 88, at 46 (“Analysis of the electricity 
industry begins with the recognition that there are three rather distinct components of it: 
generation, transmission, and distribution.”). 
 92. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (showing that with some exceptions, FERC “shall not 
have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric energy”). 
 93. Id. (conferring jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”); see also 
id. § 824(d) (defining “ ‘sale of electric energy at wholesale’ ” as “a sale of electric energy to 
any person for resale”). 
 94. Id. § 824(b)(1) (omitting FERC jurisdiction “over facilities used in local 
distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over 
facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter”). 
 95. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945). 
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that a particular generator’s electrons will power a particular con-
sumer’s home or business. Functionally, if there are any interstate 
connections on the grid, it is at least plausible that some power 
transactions will include the interstate transmission of power.96 
Hence, FERC’s authority over wholesale electricity “in interstate 
commerce” functionally became authority over any sale of power for 
resale. 
 The upshot is that federal authority over electricity sales largely 
rises and falls on the scope of the wholesale (sale-for-resale) market.97 
In the context of vertically integrated monopolies, there were few 
such sales—the monopoly generated its own power, transmitted it 
across its own lines, and distributed it to its own consumers without 
any intermediate sales. The federal role is minimal, and state com-
mission authority is at its apex. In a competitive market, by contrast, 
there will frequently be sales-for-resale (e.g., from an independent 
generator to a utility which ultimately delivers the power to a con-
sumer), and federal authority correspondingly grows.98 
 The unique attributes of this federal structure, combined with the 
dominant political position of the local monopoly vis-à-vis the Com-
mission, gave many state utility commissions ample incentive to op-
pose restructuring. On the one hand, incumbent utilities are by far 
the dominant constituency of state utility commissions; if they op-
posed introducing competition, the very fact of the monopoly would 
make it difficult for other voices to be heard.99 And on the other hand, 
state utilities could fear restructuring simply for reasons of self-
preservation: “Since PUCs [Public Utilities Commissions] are in the 
                                                                                                                  
 96. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 
404 U.S. 453 (1972), is illustrative. Due to Florida’s peninsular geography, the 
concentration of customers at the southern end of the state, and the risk of hurricanes 
disrupting the grid, Florida Power & Light was uniquely insulated from the remainder of 
the American power grid. See id. at 456. It had no direct connections to any other state 
electricity grids, though it did indirectly connect through several other Florida electric 
utilities. See id. at 456-57. Nonetheless, the Court held that commingling at these indirect 
connections was sufficient to support federal jurisdiction over the utility. Id. at 462-63. 
 97. The Federal Power Act also gives FERC jurisdiction over interstate transmission 
of electricity. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002). Under a traditional monopoly 
model, though, this authority was largely restricted to concerns over reliability rather than 
pricing because transmission expenses were bundled into the overall cost of the electricity 
purchase and did not constitute a separate transaction. See id. at 21. In a competitive 
market where transmission is unbundled and charged separately from the actual provision 
of the power, FERC has jurisdiction over the price of the transmission aspect of the 
transaction, even at the retail level. See id. 
 98. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 99. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 45; see also Terry M. Moe, The Politics of 
Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 267 (John E.  
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (noting the strategy by reformers to create 
institutions which are flawed by designed so as to stymie future attempts to undo the 
reforms). 
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business of regulating electric utilities, they might be reluctant to 
push for a change that would diminish their role.”100 Indeed, the prac-
tical structure of many competition programs could easily combine 
these concerns. Retail competition programs sometimes require that 
utilities divest their generation assets and instead participate in the 
wholesale market to acquire power. This both circumscribes the 
business model of the utility and deprives the state utility commis-
sion of significant regulatory authority (since it shifts much of the 
economic action to the interstate wholesale market, regulated by 
FERC).101 
 Despite these barriers, several states began moving towards retail 
competition in the mid-1990s. California launched a high-profile in-
vestigation into the feasibility of retail competition throughout the 
1990s, prompting many states to follow suit.102 New Hampshire be-
came the first to pass a restructuring law in May 1996; California’s 
law followed later that year.103 As of 2010, over a dozen states (pri-
marily but not exclusively in the Northeast) had allowed some form 
of retail competition within their borders.104 
                                                                                                                  
 100. HIRSH, supra note 45, at 55; see also Mayer N. Zald & Roberta Ash, Social 
Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change, 44 SOC. FORCES 327, 327 (1966) 
(arguing that “participants in [social organization] structure have a stake in preserving the 
organization, regardless of its ability to attain goals”). 
 101. See PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 473 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting 
that in Maryland, retail restructuring “divested utilities of their generation resources, 
effectively compelling Maryland energy firms to participate in the federal wholesale 
markets. . . . Maryland’s decision to participate in the federal scheme and enjoy its benefits 
was necessarily accompanied by a relinquishment of the regulatory autonomy the state 
had formerly enjoyed with respect to traditional utility monopolies”); see also New York, 
535 U.S. at 21 (upholding FERC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the terms of unbundled 
retail electricity transmission). 
  To be sure, not every state which underwent retail restructuring required 
incumbents to divest their generation assets. See Walter R. Hall II et al., History, 
Objectives, and Mechanics of Competitive Electricity Markets, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF 
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 1, 29 (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009) (“Several states mandated or 
encouraged the former utility to fully or partially divest its generation and certain 
companies chose to divest voluntarily, but most states and former integrated suppliers 
have not taken this course and thus an integrated but functionally unbundled supplier 
remains in most markets.”). Even so, it is evident that in a competitive environment it is 
more likely that there will be sales-for-resale at some point in the process between the 
electricity’s generation and ultimate consumption. 
 102. See HIRSH, supra note 45, at 248-54 (describing the CPUC’s “yellow book” and 
“blue book” reports on retail electricity restructuring). 
 103. Id. at 259-60. 
 104. See Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, supra note 2. The precise number 
of states with retail competition varies depending on how one counts states which have 
only partially implemented retail competition or have suspended prior programs. Oregon, 
for instance, allows competition for larger commercial and industrial consumers but not 
residential customers. See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF A COMPETITIVE  
POWER MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.puc.state.or.us/meetings/pmemos/2002/120302/reg4att.pdf.  
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 But the move to competition stalled out with the 2000 California 
energy crisis and Enron’s subsequent collapse.105 States which had 
previously been contemplating restructuring—even some which had 
taken significant steps in that direction—retreated due to concerns 
about market volatility.106 In West Virginia, for example, the state 
held a proceeding to consider restructuring in the late 1990s, and in 
2000 the Public Service Commission recommended electricity re-
structuring.107 The West Virginia Legislature provided initial ap-
proval for this plan in March of 2000 but reserved full implementa-
tion pending certain tax statute modifications.108 When Enron im-
ploded, the Legislature “opted not to modify the tax statutes upon 
which [the] full implementation of the Restructuring Plan rested. 
With the Restructuring Plan in a permanent state of limbo,” the 
Commission abandoned restructuring in 2002.109  
 Of course, Enron is not the only reason why retail electric compe-
tition lost its momentum—it is one high profile example of failings 
associated with the general bumps in overhauling a major American 
business sector.110 And each state has a unique cocktail of policy con-
siderations and industry circumstances which go into (or should go 
into) the decision as to whether to restructure. Nonetheless, it is fair 
to describe the California energy crisis and Enron’s subsequent col-
lapse as a “critical event” in the public understanding of energy re-
structuring.111 Both Enron and California were central players in the 
public’s understanding of free energy markets; their failures con-
                                                                                                                  
 105. See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 180 (2001) (noting that California terminated its “dalliance” with 
retail competition only a few months before Enron declared bankruptcy in 2001); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 451, 479 (2005) (“[T]he ‘just say no’ [to restructuring] group recognized that 
the California debacle and the Enron scandal provided them an unprecedented opportunity 
to . . . halt the restructuring process.”). 
 106. See Boyd, supra note 52, at 1668 (“Whereas in the years preceding the crisis 
roughly half of the states had initiated restructuring, by the mid-2000s, in the wake of the 
California crisis, many of these states had suspended or abandoned their efforts.”). 
 107. Allegheny Power, No. 05-0402-E-CN & 05-0750-E-PC, 2006 W. Va. PUC  
LEXIS 1129, at *8 (W. Va. P.U.C. Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.psc.state.wv.us/ 
scripts/WebDocket/ViewDocument.cfm?CaseActivityID=185663. 
 108. Id. at *8-9. 
 109. Id. at *9. 
 110. See Joel B. Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric 
Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295, 295-96 (2005) (“In my view and those 
of numerous others, progress toward wholesale and retail markets (‘restructuring’) has 
slowed through poor design of the regulatory and technical infrastructure and the 
combination of California, Enron, the uncertain future of FERC’s Standard Market Design 
(‘SMD’) and Wholesale Power Market Platform (‘WPMP’) proposals, states grappling with 
‘stranded costs’ and other transition issues, and complex problems of market structure and 
operation.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 111. See Meyer & Staggenborg, supra note 8, at 1638 (explaining the concept of “critical 
events” as part of social movement practice). 
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structed energy competition as unstable, unpredictable, and danger-
ous. Restructuring had sold itself on “the promise that ‘rates would 
go down,’ ” and when presented with a high-profile case of exorbitant, 
skyrocketing prices, consumers understandably grew mistrustful of 
the enterprise.112 Opponents of restructuring certainly helped press 
the issue, using these crises as proof positive that restructuring was 
inherently flawed and that competitive electricity markets would al-
ways remain dysfunctional.113 While restructuring proponents con-
tended that Enron was a case of illegal market manipulation rather 
than a failure of competition as a concept, they were unable to gain 
much traction.114 
 Whether or not it was fair to foist the sins of Enron onto the 
broader restructuring debate is beside the point. Today the state of 
retail competition has been characterized as “moribund.”115 Though 
most of the states that initially restructured have not reverted to a 
traditional monopoly model, the spread of retail choice has been 
largely stymied.116 
* * * 
 The preceding Section provided an abbreviated account of the rise, 
fall, and partial recovery of the regulated-monopoly model of electric-
ity production and distribution. It is not intended to be the full story, 
nor is it intended to assert that social movement factors were the on-
ly factor driving the relevant changes. Rather, the social movement 
account emphasizes certain features of the debate that are often un-
appreciated in explaining how regulatory structures change.  
 The successful implementation of the monopoly model relied sig-
nificantly on the construction of a social understanding of the elec-
tricity sector as in accord with its consumers, with both parties enjoy-
ing a symbiotic relationship predicated on the expansion of cheap and 
plentiful power. This generally harmonious relationship persisted 
until the 1970s, when new developments created fissures. Some of 
these developments (e.g., technological and demand plateaus) were 
largely endogenous to the electricity market, but others (e.g., the rise 
of the environmental movement and the growing trendiness of de-
                                                                                                                  
 112. See Spence, supra note 87, at 426-27, 446-47. 
 113. Id. at 417 (noting those who “see the California experience as proof that electricity 
is a unique commodity ill suited to market-based pricing”). 
 114. See id. at 472, 477 (noting the “seemingly never-ending debate between those who 
attributed the [California price] spike to market manipulation by firms like Enron and 
those who attributed it instead to flaws in the design of the market” but that ultimately 
“members of Congress . . . urged FERC to abandon its efforts to restructure the market”). 
 115. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1339, 1353 (2010). 
 116. See David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1451, 1455 & n.8 (2010). 
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regulation) emerged from the outside. These forces allowed even in-
conspicuous changes to federal utility regulation to have large and 
unexpected effects on the industry writ large. They also altered how 
certain important stakeholders (most notably, FERC) perceived de-
regulation as both a technical possibility and an ideological good.  
 This shift caused the deregulation movement to make considera-
ble strides through the 1990s, when the California energy crisis and 
Enron’s collapse stalled their momentum. These critical events pro-
vided needed ammunition for opponents of restructuring to change 
how the enterprise was framed in the public mind. Instead of a for-
ward-thinking means for invigorating a moribund industry, energy 
competition was reconstructed as dangerous and unreliable. 
III. RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS 
 Renewable Energy Credits  
are a joint product of generation and are separate from the actual 
kWh of energy produced. They are measured in energy units such 
as kWh and can be used to meet an electricity retailer’s portfolio 
requirements in lieu of acquiring and selling at retail actual kWh 
generated from eligible renewable resources.117  
A Renewable Energy Credit typically represents a certain amount of 
clean energy placed onto the grid.118 Because RECs and actual pro-
duced energy are distinct entities, they may be unbundled and sold 
separately from one another.119 Once a REC is “used”—either to meet 
legal clean energy portfolio requirements120 or to offset dirty energy 
usage by end-use consumers121—it is generally retired and cannot 
be reused.122 
                                                                                                                  
 117. David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL 
ECON. 369, 370 (2002). 
 118. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(a)(6) (2014) (defining a REC as “a tradable 
instrument that is equal to one megawatt hour of electricity or equivalent energy supplied 
by a renewable energy facility, new renewable energy facility, or reduced by 
implementation of an energy efficiency measure that is used to track and verify compliance 
with the requirements of this section as determined by the Commission”). 
 119. Gillenwater, supra note 6, at 2109 (“RECs are unbundled environmental 
commodity, and therefore may be sold separately, from the underlying electricity 
generated.”). 
 120. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 121. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 122. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (noting the widespread rule against 
double-counting RECs and the minority of states which permit the same REC to be used 
for multiple purposes). 
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 Renewable Energy Credits are traded in two primary markets.123 
The first is the “compliance” market. Many states require utilities to 
source a specified percentage of their energy from renewable provid-
ers, and the purchase of RECs is one way utilities can meet these 
statutory mandates. This marketplace is extensively regulated and 
has been the subject of significant discussion in the literature. How-
ever, RECs can also be bought and sold on the “voluntary” market. 
Even absent any legal requirement, some consumers may be willing 
to pay a premium for clean energy.124 While it is virtually impossible 
to discern whether the individual electrons that reach a particular 
consumer are “clean” or “dirty,” RECs are a way of verifying that 
clean energy equivalent to the consumer’s usage has been placed into 
the pool of electricity. 
 Unlike the compliance market, the voluntary market is subject to 
comparatively little regulation. Indeed, as will be discussed below, 
the voluntary market rests in a somewhat unique position within the 
broader sphere of electricity regulation.125 While addressing the com-
pliance market as a point of comparison, this Section will focus on 
the comparatively underexamined voluntary market and how it fits 
into the joint federal-state energy regulatory structure. 
A.  Two REC Markets 
 1.  The Compliance Market. 
 Many states have imposed Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 
which require state utilities to obtain a specified percentage of the 
electricity they sell from renewable sources.126 One way to meet these 
requirements, of course, is for the utility to invest in its own renewa-
ble generation facilities.127 Typically, though not always, states per-
mit utilities to purchase RECs to meet these requirements in lieu of 
actually buying “clean” electricity themselves.128 This option may 
                                                                                                                  
 123. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 896 (observing that RECs are “capable of being 
purchased by consumers or applied to state energy portfolio requirements separately from 
electricity”). 
 124. See id. at 906 (noting the “bragging rights” that may attach to such purchases). 
 125. See infra Part II.B. 
 126. NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2001), available at http://www.naruc.org/Publications/rps.pdf (noting 
that RPS requires that retail electricity sellers source “a certain amount of electricity from 
renewable energy resources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and various forms of 
biomass and ocean energy”). 
 127. Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 
681, 692 (2012) (“[U]tilities that are subject to RPSs can invest in their own renewable 
energy power generation facilities to earn RECs for the electricity they produce.”). 
 128. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 4, at 2274 (“The majority of states give their 
electric utility providers the option of generating electricity from renewable resources 
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make sense if, for example, the utility’s normal energy sources are 
insufficient to satisfy clean energy demand or the generators which 
can most efficiently produce renewable energy cannot cheaply trans-
mit the actual wattage to consumers.129 Because these REC sales are 
made to satisfy state mandates, trading of this sort is known as the 
REC “compliance” market. 
 The vast majority of writing on RECs focuses on their usefulness 
for RPS compliance.130 RPS rules have been promoted as critical 
measures to encourage the development of renewable generation 
sources and to decrease the proportion of electricity sales which stem 
from coal and other “dirty” resources. But RPS requirements are reg-
ulatory mandates imposed upon utilities, and so they are subject to 
the same criticisms that can be leveled at any similar legal imposi-
tion. RECs, for their part, provide enhanced flexibility for utilities 
charged with meeting RPS requirements, but “acquiring tradable 
credits without generating the corresponding kWh locally does not 
provide visible renewable energy generation resources for a commu-
nity and thus might not be acceptable to energy consumers, especial-
ly those who would be willing to pay a premium for ‘green energy.’ ”131 
 RPS are creations of state law, and states have considerable lati-
tude in determining the structure of REC trading, the types of energy 
sources which “qualify” as renewable and thus can create RECs, and 
other elements of the regulatory program.132 The preeminence of 
state authority over the field has led to two primary problems. First, 
states have naturally desired that RPS programs lead to enhanced 
renewable resources in the vicinity of the state itself—it does Georgia 
little good if its RPS subsidizes increased renewable generation in 
Iowa.133 State efforts to favor the purchase of locally produced clean 
                                                                                                                  
themselves, and/or exchanging renewable energy credits (RECs) or renewable energy 
certificates, in order to meet RPS mandates.”); see Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. 
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1810 & n.36 (2012) (listing the states where REC trading is 
permitted, limited, or prohibited as a means of meeting RPS requirements). 
 129. See Berry, supra note 117, at 371. 
 130. See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of 
a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49 
(2008); Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007); Anne Havemann, Comment, 
Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws 
with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD. L. REV. 848 (2012). 
 131. Berry, supra note 117, at 371. 
 132. See Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004, 61,007 (2003) (concluding that because 
RPS rules are creations of state law, it is up to state utility commissions to determine 
whether generators or utilities own the RECs associated with power purchased under 
PURPA). 
 133. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 
268-78 (1999). 
966  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:937 
 
energy (or RECs derived from such local sources) raise significant 
dormant commerce clause issues.134 Second, because states can and 
do have different definitions for what qualifies as a renewable re-
source, there are barriers to the interstate trade of RECs—a REC 
which may validly apply against RPS requirements in Utah may not 
do so in Colorado. This raises commerce clause issues of its own; it 
has also prompted some commentators to press for a national RPS 
standard.135 
 2.  The Voluntary Market 
 The compliance market derives its force from state-imposed legal 
requirements that give value to renewably generated electricity. 
Even where there is no legal duty to act, however, some consumers 
may wish to purchase green power on their own initiative. These 
“voluntary” purchases of green energy are a rapidly increasing pro-
portion of renewable electricity sales.136  
 One important area of distinction between the compliance and 
voluntary markets is the primary purchaser of the RECs. The com-
pliance market is dominated by utilities, because RPS mandates are 
placed upon electricity retailers, not electricity consumers. Hence, 
utilities purchase RECs from renewable energy generators or bro-
kers—either bundled or unbundled from the electric power itself. The 
consumers are not involved and, unless the utilities are permitted to 
pass their potentially higher costs onward, may not even be affect-
ed.137 Along this axis, compliance REC trading is not materially dif-
ferent from the electricity market norm. 
 In the voluntary market, by contrast, the consumers are usually 
the purchasers of the RECs. This places them in a relatively unique 
position of having the ability to interact and deal directly with power 
producers, or independent REC brokers, regardless of the regulated 
                                                                                                                  
 134. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The 
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL  
GAS & ENERGY L. 59 (2011); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013); Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 259 (2008); Havemann, supra note 130. But see Engel, supra note 133, at 250 
(arguing that state preferences for locally produced renewable energy should pass muster 
under the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 135. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 115, at 1341-44 (noting that more than 25 proposals 
for a national RPS have been introduced in Congress). 
 136. See supra note 3. 
 137. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d 
105, 110 (N.M. 2007) (addressing a utility’s right to automatically recoup costs associated 
with buying RECs in order to comply with a state RPS program). 
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or deregulated structure of their state retail market. RECs are dis-
tinct in that they are an electricity “product” that is not tied to the 
flow of electrons and thus can be bought and sold outside the electric-
ity grid system.138 REC sales thus bypass the natural monopoly and 
offer opportunities for buyers to interact with a multitude of potential 
sellers even where electricity markets are not otherwise open for 
competition. 
 Voluntary REC purchases come in three main varieties. In states 
with electricity competition, consumers often may simply choose to 
buy their electricity from companies that produce some or all of their 
electricity from renewable sources.139 Even in monopoly states, 
though, some states and utilities are offering “green pricing” plans, 
wherein the utility offers consumers the option to pay a premium for 
green power.140 Like in the compliance market, the utility then typi-
cally has a choice regarding whether it will directly source green en-
ergy or instead purchase an equivalent amount of RECs to cover the 
consumer’s energy usage.141 Finally, there is an “unbundled” REC 
market where consumers can purchase just the RECs without acquir-
ing any corresponding electricity voltage.142 
 Because the voluntary market is decoupled from specific state 
mandates, regulation of RECs trading on the voluntary market is 
relatively minimal. In North Carolina, for instance, even the defini-
tion of a REC is restricted to those sold for purposes of complying 
with the state’s RPS requirements.143 Indeed, the only regulation 
North Carolina has put forward with respect to voluntary REC sales 
is a requirement that a single REC not be “double-counted” for both 
voluntary and compliance purposes.144 Michigan likewise appears to 
                                                                                                                  
 138. Cf. Ferrey, supra note 134, at 63-64 (noting that RECs “are not subject to 
geographic or physical limitation”). 
 139. HEETER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Delmas & Montes-Sancho, supra note 4, at 2274. 
 142. HEETER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
 143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(a)(6) (2014) (defining a REC as “a tradable instrument 
that is equal to one megawatt hour of electricity or equivalent energy supplied by a 
renewable energy facility, new renewable energy facility, or reduced by implementation of 
an energy efficiency measure that is used to track and verify compliance with the 
requirements of this section as determined by the Commission”) (emphasis added); 4 N.C. 
ADMIN. CODE 11 R08-66(b) (2014) (requiring the registration of any renewable energy 
facility (inside and outside of North Carolina) which “intends for renewable energy 
certificates it earns to be eligible for use by an electric power supplier to comply with [RPS 
requirements]”) (emphasis added); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 460.1041(2) (2014) (“An 
electric provider is responsible for demonstrating that a renewable energy credit used to 
comply with a renewable energy credit standard is derived from a renewable energy source 
and that the electric provider has not previously used or traded, sold, or otherwise 
transferred the renewable energy credit.”) (emphasis added). 
 144. 4 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 11 R08-66(b)(4) (2014). This rule against double-counting is 
common amongst state REC regulations and is generally accepted by REC market 
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consider RECs to solely be a feature of the compliance market—it 
states that a “renewable energy credit shall not be granted for re-
newable energy the renewable attributes of which are used by an 
electric provider in a commission-approved voluntary renewable en-
ergy program.”145 The absence of consistent definitions poses particu-
lar problems in the voluntary market, however, as the relatively ab-
stract nature of what a REC represents poses the potential for con-
siderable consumer confusion and abuse.146 
 At its broadest, a REC is a “green jewel box” which encompasses 
all positive environmental attributes of a given form of electricity 
production.147 But defining RECs broadly creates considerable ambi-
guity regarding what RECs actually represent and whether they ac-
tually transfer a property right to specific emissions reductions.148 It 
is of course very difficult to “dynamically score” the total environmen-
tal impact of any particular generation project. The more RECs are 
said to represent, the harder these claims are to verify and the fur-
ther they begin to stray from a quantifiable good that represents a 
particular tradable attribute. Moreover, as the qualities of a “REC” 
grow more abstract and less amenable to standardization, their use-
fulness as a tradable instrument diminishes. As Michael Gillenwater 
puts it: 
Environmental markets that operate with a clearly defined com-
modity are more likely to have low transaction costs and produce 
public good benefits. Environmental commodities that lack clear 
definitions will have higher transaction costs. And when traded in 
                                                                                                                  
participants. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2004(7)(c) (2014) (“Renewable energy 
credits sold through a voluntary service . . . may not be applied against a public utility's or 
competitive electricity supplier’s obligation to meet the [renewable portfolio] standards.”); 
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 86 (7th ed. 2013) 
(“A REC shall be counted only once for compliance with the California [Renewables 
Portfolio Standard] and may not be used to count toward the regulatory requirements of 
any other state or to satisfy any other retail regulatory or voluntary market product 
claims.”). Letter from Lawrence Silverstein, Senior Vice President & Managing Dir., 
NextEra Energy Power Mktg., LLC, to NEPOOL REC Sellers (May 15, 2014), available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164899/vtspeedltrtonepoolrecsellers4-15-14.pdf 
(“It is a fundamental principle of all renewable energy market sales that the 
environmental characteristics associated with the electric energy generated cannot be 
counted or claimed twice.”). It is not, however, universal. See Bird & Lokey, supra note 3, 
at 21 (noting that Arizona, Vermont, and Wisconsin allow voluntary purchases to count 
towards meeting RPS requirements and that several other states are silent on the subject). 
 145. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 460.1039(1)(c) (2014). 
 146. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 947 (arguing that a uniform definition of a REC 
“gives consumers more fluency in the market, allowing them to better choose between 
competing options. This is uniquely imperative with environmental products, where 
significant information asymmetries exist because of difficult-to-verify attributes, and 
where health and safety command special attention”). 
 147. See Jaap Jansen, A Green Jewel Box?, ENVTL. FIN., March 2003, at 27, 27. 
 148. See Gillenwater, supra note 6, at 2112.  
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separate markets, poorly defined commodities will more easily 
come into conflict and cause confusion among market partici-
pants.149 
 RECs can also be given a narrow scope to refer only to the fact 
that “(i) the underlying specific quantity of renewables-based electric-
ity has been produced under the conditions specified by the standard 
information on the certificate and (ii) that the certificate has not yet 
been used for another application.”150 “Used” must be interpreted 
broadly so as to not exploit consumer ignorance over renewable pow-
er transactions. The arrangement described in SZ Enterprises LLC v. 
Iowa Utilities Board provides a striking example.151 There, a solar 
energy company contracted with Dubuque, Iowa to construct a solar 
facility which would “provide the city with renewable energy.”152 The 
city would purchase the entire output of the solar facility, but the so-
lar company would retain ownership of the RECs (with the stated 
intention that they would sell them to other parties).153 The problem 
with this proposal is that once the RECs are sold, it is misleading to 
say that Dubuque is being provided with renewable energy.154 
Though the RECs have not been “used” by Dubuque in a formal 
sense—they were apparently not retired or used to satisfy RPS re-
quirements—by representing to the city and its citizens that it was 
providing them with renewable energy, Dubuque functionally used 
its renewable attributes, and the solar company should not have been 
allowed to reuse them for sale to other parties. 
B.  The Structure of REC Regulation 
 Despite encompassing a large portion of the overall REC market-
place, there is virtually no case law or regulation discussing issues 
specific to voluntary REC transactions. As of the writing of this Arti-
cle, no case has addressed matters related to voluntary REC transac-
tions specifically, and only a scattered few have addressed general 
issues related to REC transactions outside the compliance market 
context.155 This is a troubling omission, because the unique attributes 
                                                                                                                  
 149. Michael Gillenwater, Redefining RECs—Part 2: Untangling Certificates and 
Emission Markets, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 2120, 2120 (2008). 
 150. Jansen, supra note 147, at 27.  
 151. 850 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 2014). 
 152. Id. at 444. 
 153. See id. at 444-45 (noting that the city would get one-third of any revenues 
associated with REC sales). 
 154. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.15(d) (2014) (“If a marketer generates renewable electricity 
but sells renewable energy certificates for all of that electricity, it would be deceptive for 
the marketer to represent, directly or by implication, that it uses renewable energy.”). 
 155. The closest examples are decisions regarding which entity—generator or 
purchasing utility—owns RECs generated under PURPA contracts. See, e.g., Wheelabrator 
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of the REC market make it difficult to locate inside our system of 
electricity federalism. 
 The division of authority between the federal government and the 
states in the electricity context, formalized in the Federal Power 
Act,156 initially grew out of the Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Pub-
lic Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec-
tricity.157 Attleboro Steam & Electricity, a Massachusetts company, 
contracted to buy electricity produced by a Rhode Island generator.158 
The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission attempted to assert 
authority to regulate the rates of the contract.159 The Supreme Court 
concluded, however, that this would place a “direct burden upon in-
terstate commerce” in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.160 
The Court specifically held that neither Rhode Island nor Massachu-
setts could regulate the transaction, but rather “if such regulation is 
required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested in 
Congress.”161 Since Congress had to this point not enacted any com-
prehensive statutes enabling electricity regulation,162 the Federal 
Power Act was passed in attempt to bridge the “Attleboro gap.”  
 Despite considerable churn in the development and regulation of 
the electricity industry, the Federal Power Act’s division of state and 
national responsibility has proved remarkably durable. The entire 
structure, however, is based on the nature of how power is physically 
delivered from generator to consumer. RECs, which are an “electrici-
ty” product entirely divorced from the actual physical channels of 
power distribution, do not have a clear place inside this framework. 
This makes the scope of state and federal authority over them quite 
unclear. Since they are primarily associated with either state-created 
RPS programs or end-user (retail) purchases, the federal government 
has displayed limited interest in regulating RECs from an electricity 
perspective (though the FTC has taken some steps to regulate them 
                                                                                                                  
Lisbon, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 531 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Morgantown Energy Assocs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 2:12-cv-6327, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140220, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2013); ARIPPA v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 966 
A.2d 1204, 1212-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). FERC has decided that this question is not 
governed by PURPA but is one of state law. See Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 
(2003). 
 156. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.  
 157. 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
 158. Id. at 84.  
 159. See id. at 84-86. 
 160. Id. at 89-90. 
 161. Id. at 90. 
 162. The first federal statute dealing with electricity regulation, the Federal Water 
Power Act, was passed in 1920 but had a relatively narrow scope focusing on hydroelectric 
power. The law was superseded by the Federal Power Act. See Sharon Jacobs, Bypassing 
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 892 (2015). 
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from a consumer protection standard). However, shorn from the Fed-
eral Power Act’s delineation of regulatory responsibility, state regula-
tion of voluntary RECs may run into significant dormant commerce 
clause problems. This lacuna may insulate voluntary REC sales from 
protectionist state utility commissions, making them an ideal point of 
entry for electricity market participants who seek to get a “foot in the 
door” in otherwise closed marketplaces.163 
 1.  The Federal Role 
 As Jim Rossi and Thomas Hutton observe, energy and environ-
mental law have historically diverged in the degree of national uni-
formity typically demanded by the relevant statutory schema.164 In 
the environmental context, federal law typically sets a “floor” which 
all states must meet but then permits individual states to impose 
more stringent requirements or other policy innovations that exceed 
the national standard.165 By contrast, in the electric power context, 
“industry enjoys a national standard and need not tailor its activities 
to suit numerous regulators across smaller or more regional mar-
kets.”166 This is not entirely true, obviously, as individual states are 
vested with the authority to regulate the retail distribution of power 
and their decisions regarding how to structure the retail market vary 
considerably.167 Rather, their core observation is that where Congress 
has crafted federal regulations regarding electric power, it is as-
sumed that those regulations are meant to unify the entire field of 
regulation on that subject.168 
 Clean energy programs lie at the interstices of these two fields. 
And REC sales present a particularly unique problem. There is cur-
rently little basis in federal law to regulate RECs at all (excepting 
generally applicable consumer protection standards).169 Despite the 
interstate character of the market, FERC only has a limited role in 
regulating RECs. Recall that the Federal Power Act gives FERC au-
thority to regulate “the transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.”170 REC sales are neither, at least where the RECs are 
                                                                                                                  
 163. See infra Part III. 
 164. See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
 165. See id. at 1289-90. 
 166. Id. at 1291. 
 167. See supra Part I.B. 
 168. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 164, at 1303-04. 
 169. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 
(2014). Another exception is where the RECs are bundled with wholesale power 
transactions. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. 
 170. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2014). 
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unbundled from the sale of electric energy.171 Nor were REC sales 
necessarily contemplated as part of the transactions regulated by 
PURPA. In 2003, FERC explicitly held that the contracts it approved 
for electricity purchases from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) did not ad-
dress, one way or another, who held title to RECs and that such deci-
sions were a matter of state law.172 FERC confirmed this judgment in 
2012, stating that “a REC does not constitute the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce or the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce. Therefore, RECs and contracts for 
the sale of RECs are not themselves jurisdictional facilities subject to 
the Commission’s jurisdiction under” the Federal Power Act.173 The 
sole exception was if the RECs were bundled with the sale of electric 
power. In such circumstances, the Commission held that REC sales 
could affect the rates of the interstate power transaction and thus fell 
under the Commission’s authority.174 
 Beyond FERC, it is likely that the FTC could exercise limited au-
thority to regulate voluntary REC sales to the extent that there is a 
“widespread pattern of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”175 FTC 
regulations could curb some of the more flagrant labeling problems 
associated with RECs, enhancing the transparency of REC sales.176 
For example, several environmentalists recently petitioned the FTC 
to investigate a Vermont power company which reportedly was mar-
keting power sold to consumers as “renewable” while selling the as-
sociated RECs to New England utilities for RPS compliance purpos-
es.177 The petition remains under review; interestingly, the power 
company has argued that it is not subject to FTC jurisdiction at all 
because Vermont’s status as a monopoly state necessarily means the 
company is not “marketing” its products to consumers (who lack the 
ability to choose an alternative provider).178 
                                                                                                                  
 171. See WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2012) (concluding that unbundled REC sales 
are outside of FERC’s jurisdiction but that REC sales bundled with electric energy are 
FERC jurisdictional). 
 172. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2003). 
 173. WSPP Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (2012). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(3)(B) (2014). 
 176. See Crandall, supra note 6, at 947-50 (articulating potential bases for FTC 
authority). 
 177. Petition to Investigate Deceptive Trade Practices of Green Mountain Power Co. 
in the Marketing of Renewable Energy to Vermont Consumers at 1 (Sept. 15, 2014),  
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/624571/ 
140915gmpvermontlawpetition.pdf.  
 178. Id. at 18-19 (quoting Letter from Douglas Smith, Dir. of Power Supply,  
Green Mountain Power Co., to Susan Hudson, Clerk, Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. (Dec. 20, 2012)), 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/624571/ 
140915gmpvermontlawpetition.pdf.  
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 It seems unlikely that the FTC will agree that it lacks jurisdiction 
over allegedly misleading claims by monopoly electricity providers to 
their customers. But regardless, the FTC neither has the institution-
al capacity nor (in all likelihood) the desire to issue regulations de-
signed to affect the substantive nature of the retail or wholesale elec-
tricity market.179 To the extent that it chooses to intervene in REC 
markets, it is likely to do so in an extremely narrow fashion focusing 
on deceptive or misleading claims, rather than engaging in wholesale 
regulation of voluntary REC markets. And where any regulation or 
guidance does approach broader issues relating to electricity market 
regulations, it will likely be highly deferential to FERC—an agency 
that has been considerably more supportive of electricity competition 
than many of its state-level peers.180 
 2.  The State Role 
 Because voluntary REC sales are most closely associated with the 
retail market, states have some authority to regulate voluntary REC 
sales—though this authority is largely untested. Outside the general 
state law contract principles which would apply to any transaction 
for RECs,181 states have the clear ability to regulate when addressing 
the domestic intersection of the voluntary and compliance markets. 
FERC has already decreed that RECs—at least when used in the 
compliance context—are creations of state law and thus generally 
subject to state jurisdiction.182 Even states with minimal regulation of 
voluntary REC trades usually have policies forbidding the “double-
counting” of RECs for both compliance and voluntary purposes.183 
“Green pricing” programs run by the incumbent monopoly utilities 
also are an easy target for state regulation, as these utilities’ services 
are already under the pervasive oversight of state commissions.184 
                                                                                                                  
 179. Federal enforcement of green guidelines has been markedly inconsistent across 
administrations. See Perrin Cooke, Note, Green Guide Gaps: Expanding FTC Authority 
over Low-Carbon Marketing Claims, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 105, 125-27 (2014) (noting the 
complete drop-off in FTC enforcement actions against misleading green claims during the 
Bush administration and their revival under the Obama administration). 
 180. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1367 (noting that FERC was historically 
one of the great champions of electricity market restructuring). 
 181. See, e.g., Colo. & Santa Fe Energy Co. v. Nexant, Inc., No. C 12-00011 JSW, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137514, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012) (applying California law to a 
suit alleging breach of contract where a REC buyer allegedly refused delivery under a 
contract for sale); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 329 P.3d 1264, 
1271 (Mont. 2014) (applying general contract and state law principles to conclude that a 
mandatory forum-selection clause contained in a REC sale contract required that the 
dispute be litigated in California). 
 182. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 184. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-8-210(2) (2014) (“[A] public utility shall offer its 
customers the option of purchasing a product composed of or supporting power from 
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 But states are limited in their regulatory authority as well. The 
Dormant Commerce Clause places sharp limitations on the ability of 
a state to provide explicit or implicit preferences for products pro-
duced within its own borders.185 Most obviously, states can only in the 
rarest of circumstances explicitly discriminate against out-of-state 
commercial actors.186 A state-created private monopoly presumptively 
runs afoul of this restriction, as the functional effect is to restrict 
commercial activity to one (in-state) firm to the exclusion of all others 
(including all out-of-state competition).187 Unless permitted by Con-
gress,188 “[s]tate and local governments may not use their regulatory 
power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-
state competitors or their facilities.”189 
 For similar reasons, a state may not mandate that some or all of a 
given product be purchased from in-state providers. In Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute 
which demanded that ten percent of the coal used by state utilities 
derive from Oklahoma sources.190 The same logic would almost cer-
tainly prevent a state from prohibiting or disincentivizing the use of 
RECs generated from out-of-state providers from being used to meet 
RPS requirements, let alone bar their purchase on the voluntary 
market.191 
 Between those poles lie some thorny, and largely uncharted, regu-
latory questions. RECs can only be created when electricity is gener-
                                                                                                                  
certified environmentally preferred resources that include but are not limited to wind, 
solar, geothermal, and biomass, subject to review and approval by the commission. The 
commission shall ensure that these resources have been certified as meeting industry-
accepted standards.”). 
 185. These limitations are default rules, but Congress can always authorize a state to 
engage in regulation that would otherwise violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See  
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981) (“If Congress 
ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action 
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered 
invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge.”). 
 186. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“[O]nce a state law is shown to 
discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect, the 
burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local 
purpose, and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 187. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1994). But 
see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 341-
42 (2007) (distinguishing Carbone where the monopoly was granted to a public entity). 
 188. See supra note 185. State authority to establish retail electricity monopolies can 
be implicitly found in the Federal Power Act. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 189. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394. 
 190. 502 U.S. 437, 440, 455 (1992). 
 191. See Eisen, supra note 110, at 308 (“In fact, a state cannot allow only power 
generated and sold within the state by in-state utilities to counts [sic] toward the 
renewables requirement. If it did so the RPS would clearly run afoul of the dormant 
commerce clause.”). 
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ated. A regulation of RECs necessarily regulates electricity genera-
tion as well. Where a REC emerges from electricity generated out-of-
state, state regulation borders precipitously on impermissible, extra-
territorial lawmaking, in violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.192 A generation project located in state A, whose power is sold 
entirely to state B, would have to meet the requirements of state C if 
even a portion of any associated RECs were placed into that market. 
 National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer is in-
structive.193 There, Wisconsin prohibited use of Wisconsin landfills 
unless the waste was generated in a region that had an “effective re-
cycling program” (as defined in the Wisconsin statute).194 The Sev-
enth Circuit struck down the law: 
Wisconsin’s solid waste legislation conditions the use of Wisconsin 
landfills by non-Wisconsin waste generators on their home com-
munities’ adoption and enforcement of Wisconsin recycling stand-
ards; all persons in that non-Wisconsin community must adhere to 
the Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump their waste in 
Wisconsin. . . . As a price for access to the Wisconsin market, it at-
tempts to assume control of the integrity of the product that is 
moving in interstate commerce. Wisconsin’s approach to sound sol-
id waste management, and no one else’s, must govern, even when 
the product will never cross its borders.195 
 By contrast, in Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Epel the 
District of Colorado upheld a state RPS program against claims that 
it required out-of-state producers to generate electricity in accord-
ance with Colorado’s definition of “renewable” power.196 The court 
concluded that an RPS requirement does not impose any require-
ments whatsoever on out-of-state electricity generators—Colorado 
utilities can “buy and sell electricity from any in-state or out-of-state 
generator. The [RPS] does not limit these transactions, set minimum 
standards for out-of-state generators that wish to do business in Col-
orado, or attempt to control pricing of the electricity.”197 Nor does the 
RPS mandate have any effect on wholly out-of-state transactions—a 
sale from a Wyoming generator to a South Dakota utility, for in-
                                                                                                                  
 192. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 
582-83 (1986) (holding that laws which, in “practical effect,” regulate out-of-state 
transactions are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause (citing S. Pac. Co. 
v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945))). 
 193. See Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 194. Id. at 653. 
 195. Id. at 658, 661. 
 196. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64285, at *19 (D. Colo. May 9, 2014). 
 197. Id. at *20-21. 
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stance.198 The only time the RPS program comes into play is if the 
out-of-state generators wished for their energy to count towards Col-
orado’s RPS mandate.199 
 Epel suggests that the Dormant Commerce Clause is not implicat-
ed so long as foreign power generators can access the REC market on 
equal terms compared to in-state (Colorado) peers. This has very dif-
ferent implications in the context of the voluntary REC market com-
pared to the compliance market Epel addressed. Consider the ques-
tion of whether RECs can be sold “unbundled” from corresponding 
power sales. While most states permit unbundled RECs to count to-
wards meeting RPS goals, some require that the power and RECs be 
sold together.200 The compliance RPS market exists at the wholesale 
level—the power at issue is being sold to utilities for resale to con-
sumers—and so there is opportunity for various players (including 
out-of-state firms) to participate in providing RPS-eligible renewable 
power even if the local commission imposes a bundling requirement. 
But the voluntary market occurs at the retail level—a bundling re-
quirement there would take the utilities’ sanctioned monopoly over 
retail sale of power and bootstrap it onto the REC market as well. As 
neither the Federal Power Act nor any other statute gives state regu-
lators the authority to circumvent the Dormant Commerce Clause 
where REC sales are concerned, this would seem to run afoul of con-
stitutional strictures.201 
 Because states have yet to extensively regulate voluntary REC 
sales and there have been no reported cases concerning the subject, 
assessing how these questions will ultimately be answered is at best 
speculative. Still, certain predictions can be made. States probably 
can impose general standards of conduct upon voluntary REC sales, 
including requirements of transparency, enumeration of specific fuels 
considered to be or not be “renewable” in character, and other like 
concerns. These requirements would have to be universal, however; 
they could not discriminate against out-of-state REC providers. Nor, 
in all likelihood, could states simply grant the exclusive right to sell 
RECs to a single provider (most likely, the incumbent monopoly). In 
essence, while states retain considerable regulatory authority over 
the voluntary REC market, their powers—and their ability to block 
competition outright—are not nearly as expansive as they are in the 
retail electricity sector generally. 
                                                                                                                  
 198. Id. at *19-20. 
 199. Id. at *21. 
 200. See supra note 128; see also, e.g., N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. 
Regulation Comm’n, No. 33,244, 2012 N.M. Unpub. LEXIS 2, at *3-5 (N.M. June 7, 2012) 
(declining, on mootness grounds, to review a New Mexico Commission ruling which 
rejected an RPS compliance plan that incorporated unbundled RECs). 
 201. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE FOOT IN THE DOOR: VOLUNTARY REC SALES AND ELECTRICITY 
COMPETITION 
 Even though the call for retail electricity competition has died 
down, it is unlikely that the cause of electricity choice has been 
abandoned for good. On the one hand, “traditional regulation . . . will 
remain vulnerable to opportunistic attacks from organized groups, 
e.g., large industrials, independent producers, and even some utili-
ties, or political entrepreneurs who stand to reap large gains from a 
change in the status quo.”202 On the other hand, incumbent inter-
ests—often with the support of friendly state regulators—will con-
tinue to fight vigorously to maintain their privileged position in the 
status quo.203 The outcome of such battles will likely depend on the 
relative strength of the political and economic interests that can be 
brought to bear against the relevant regulatory authorities. 
 Proponents of electricity restructuring have already created an 
umbrella lobbying group known as the COMPETE Coalition, consist-
ing of “781 electricity stakeholders, including customers, suppliers, 
traditional and clean energy generators, transmission owners, trade 
associations, technology innovators, environmental organizations and 
economic development corporations.”204 This organization, whose 
membership ranges from Sempra Energy (parent of San Diego Gas & 
Electric) to the Wendy’s/Arby’s Group,205 helps organize diverse enti-
ties within the electricity marketplace in support of “well-structured 
competitive electricity markets.”206 While organizations like 
COMPETE will no doubt be relevant to crafting and implementing a 
broad-based strategy in pursuit of restructuring, this Part does not 
focus on such traditional lobbying forms. Rather, in keeping with the 
analysis in Part I, it focuses on how the seemingly mundane decision 
to enter into the voluntary REC market could itself open opportuni-
ties in a manner similar to more traditional social movement  
advocacy. 
 The prior Sections demonstrate two important features about the 
voluntary REC market pertinent to its impact on retail restructuring 
debates. First, it is a unique transaction in the electricity context be-
                                                                                                                  
 202. John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 
ENERGY L.J. 273, 303 (2004). 
 203. See Pierce, supra note 105, at 491-92 (arguing that the “just say no” utilities and 
their allied state utility commissions will continue to oppose retail competition for the 
foreseeable future); see also supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text (noting the various 
forces blocking retail electricity restructuring). 
 204. About COMPETE: Competition in Electricity Markets, COMPETE, 
http://www.competecoalition.com/about (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 205. COMPETE Coalition Members, COMPETE, http://www.competecoalition.com/ 
members (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 206. About COMPETE, supra note 204. 
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cause it bypasses the natural monopoly created by the wires and thus 
enables direct contact between retail consumers and multiple market 
participants, even where restructuring has not occurred. Second, 
states are limited in their ability to limit competition in this area—at 
least compared to their expansive authority to create and maintain a 
monopoly in the retail electricity sector more broadly. 
 These characteristics of the voluntary REC market share im-
portant characteristics with prior market developments which have 
helped spur energy competition and overcome resistance from in-
cumbent monopolies. Although RECs are not themselves a dominant 
part of the retail electricity market, their relatively unregulated na-
ture gives new market entrants a toehold in markets that otherwise 
are entirely closed off to competition.207 From humble beginnings, 
these external players can gather customers, lobby legislators and 
administrative agencies, and effectively present themselves as genu-
ine, lower-cost alternatives to the incumbent monopolies. 
 To be sure, this is not an inevitability. There are several reasons 
to refrain from overstating the pro-competitive effects of voluntary 
REC transactions. The connection between REC sales and retail elec-
tricity service is more attenuated than, say, the connection between 
small generator competition authorized by PURPA and generation 
markets more broadly. Moreover, observing that states have compar-
atively less authority over voluntary RECs is not to say they have 
none—a sufficiently aggressive state regulatory commission could 
still find creative ways to intervene in favor of the incumbent monop-
oly and against novel market entrants.  
 Yet the strategy of using RECs as a foot in the door to promote 
wider reform effort retains appeal. The literature on law and social 
movements offers a fruitful way of understanding how a seemingly 
minor alteration in the economic structure of electricity markets 
might have significant impacts on a related, yet clearly distinct, poli-
cy debate. Voluntary RECs offer a chance for additional electricity 
market participants to gain influence in new states and territories, 
directly engage with potential customers and recruit them as allies in 
broader political campaigns, and create the space for partial reforms 
which may, over time, grease the path down toward larger electricity 
reform initiatives. 
                                                                                                                  
 207. See Ingo Vogelsang, Network Utilities in the U.S. – Sector Reforms Without 
Privatization 24 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1142, 2004), available at  
https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails? 
wp_num=1142&CESifoWP.search=+ (“Liberalization almost invariably started with 
entrepreneurs who tried to overcome regulatory entry barriers. Under the multifaceted 
U.S. regulatory system they were able to get a foot in the door and offer services in some 
restricted geographic or product space.”). 
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 Conceptualizing the business decision to enter the voluntary REC 
market in social movement terms reveals how this maneuver could 
alter the playing field and reinvigorate the case for electricity re-
structuring. The presumed natural monopoly of utilities seemed to 
make retail competition impossible; even once experience with 
wholesale wheeling illuminated a theoretical path to retail restruc-
turing, after an initial burst of success, advocates of restructuring 
have found no way to alter the political dynamics in states that con-
tinue to adhere to the old monopoly model. The development of a vol-
untary REC market—an electricity “product” that can be sold direct-
ly to consumers regardless of the overall state of the retail electricity 
market—reshuffles the deck and provides new opportunities for 
market penetration. 
 In short, voluntary RECs matter to advocates of retail restructur-
ing, but not because they represent some massive new economic op-
portunity or require regulatory interpretations that demand retail 
competition as well. Their impacts are more subtle, relating to how 
advocates for restructuring can alter their position in the communi-
ties they wish to influence. Such seemingly minor changes can cast a 
large shadow when attempting to tackle longstanding incumbent 
monopolies and the agencies which are responsible for creating the 
pertinent regulatory climate. Surveying efforts by reformers to alter 
entrenched but (arguably) inefficient political systems, Eric Patash-
nik identifies three key conditions for successful social change: First, 
reformers must alter the procedural context used to make decisions, 
as the defaults typically favor incumbents; second, they must raise 
awareness amongst unengaged citizens; and third, they must often 
make tactical concessions to their opposition to enable a viable re-
form coalition to emerge.208 As will be demonstrated in the final Sec-
tion, voluntary REC sales carry with them the potential to enable 
each of these conditions. 
A.  Persuading Policymakers and Altering Decisional Defaults 
 Advocates of retail restructuring in a monopoly state suffer from a 
chicken-and-egg problem—they must gain a foothold in a state in or-
der to have any hope of influencing policymakers and regulators who 
already have strong connections to incumbent monopolies; but that 
very monopoly status under debate prevents them from gaining any 
leverage within the state. Voluntary REC sales offer an opportunity 
to shift the political calculus in locations where the influence of mo-
nopoly providers has been relatively uncontested. In essence, the vol-
untary REC market alters the procedural order of the retail electrici-
                                                                                                                  
 208. PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 19-22. 
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ty debate by moving the initial decision—can there be competition at 
all—out of the hands of the regulatory body.209 Generators, power 
marketers, and other market participants which have no way of 
reaching consumers in regulated environments can easily participate 
in the REC market without running afoul of the incumbent’s exclu-
sive monopoly franchise. In other words, the voluntary REC market 
changes the political and economic posture of the entities seeking re-
tail competition—instead of being pure outsiders with no connection 
with or constituency within the target state, they can come to regula-
tors and policymakers with a list of consumers and potential base of 
support already in place.210 
 Of course, the voluntary REC market does not itself demand that 
these proposals come to fruition. Signing up a voluntary REC cus-
tomer does not, for example, grant the company any retail authority, 
nor is such authority necessary for REC markets to function proper-
ly. This is rather a story about altering the political and regulatory 
landscape.211 Voluntary REC sales provide a foot in the door for addi-
tional participants beyond the monopoly providers to gain leverage 
and influence as economic and political players in hitherto monopoly 
regions. 
 Eugene Volokh’s notion of a “political power slippery slope” is a 
useful analogue.212 He provides the example of a hypothetical Su-
preme Court decision permitting the sale of marijuana while also al-
lowing Congress to ban its advertisement.213 On its face, this decision 
would allow Congress to decriminalize marijuana without worrying 
that such an enactment would necessarily lead to the advertisement 
of the drug.214 But practically speaking, the legalization of marijuana 
will create a multi-billion dollar industry with a strong incentive to 
                                                                                                                  
 209. See Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political 
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 73-74 (2000) (outlining the importance of sequencing 
in determining political outcomes). 
 210. See PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 28 (noting that while political scientists often 
“focus on durable changes in formal authority. . . . [T]he uncoordinated and often 
unpredictable choices of producers and millions of consumers arguably often have a greater 
influence over social outcomes in many policy sectors than do elected officials, lobbyists, or 
voters.”). 
 211. Much has been written about “policy feedback”—the idea that “policies may 
themselves reshape the political environment.” Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The 
Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and 
Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 60 (2004); see also PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 29. 
This argument differs slightly in that it posits how an emergent market opportunity might 
alter the political environment of a related but distinct business sector. 
 212. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 
1114-20 (2003). 
 213. Id. at 1114. 
 214. See id. (“Now Congress can enact a law that allows marijuana sales but not 
advertising (decision A) without fear that the Court will hold that marijuana advertising 
must also be legal (result B).”). 
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overturn the advertising ban as well.215 In effect, the law creates a 
new powerful interest group which—although not guaranteed to pre-
vail in Congress or the court of public opinion—certainly is better 
positioned to advance its interests than it was prior to the initial  
decision. 
 A similar story can be told regarding the introduction of competi-
tion into the long-distance telephone services market. For many 
years a sector monopolized by the Bell system, the initial crack of 
competition came when the FCC allowed other companies to offer 
“private line” services.216 At the time, the FCC did not view this as a 
dramatic step—one commissioner characterized it as providing “a 
little salt and pepper of competition to” the general rule of regulatory 
protection.217 But the direct-line firms had no interest in staying con-
fined inside their box and quickly moved to expand into the general 
long-distance telephone markets.218 Though initially resistant, the 
FCC proved unable to maintain its opposition for long, “and the rest, 
as they say, is history.”219 
 As the preceding Section demonstrated, the voluntary REC mar-
ket lacks the economic and regulatory characteristics that give state 
regulatory commissions authority to block retail electricity competi-
tion.220 It is not a natural monopoly, and neither the Federal Power 
Act nor any other statute enables states to circumvent the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and enact protective legislation favoring local utili-
ties. These characteristics provide a safe harbor for competition, but 
only a limited one—the ability to sell RECs freely does nothing to al-
ter the plenary authority state commissions possess over retail 
wheeling. However, just as in Volokh’s example where the hypothet-
ical court decision only guaranteed the ability to sell marijuana, not 
the right to advertise it, the ability to engage in voluntary REC sales 
creates new stakeholders who in turn can accumulate political capi-
tal for the pursuit of additional reforms. 
                                                                                                                  
 215. See id. at 1114-15. 
 216. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1342-43 (discussing Applications of 
Microwave Commc’ns, Inc. for Constr. Permits, 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969) and Establishment 
of Policies & Procedures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized Common 
Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 29 F.C.C.2d 870 
(1971)). 
 217. Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications 
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 845 (1997) (quoting Comm’r Nicolas Johnson). 
 218. See id. (observing that the direct-line decision “sparked a conflagration that the 
FCC could not contain”); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1343 (“But competition could 
not be easily confined to private-line services.”).  
 219. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 74, at 1343; see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 
F.2d 365, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (overturning an FCC decision rejecting direct competition 
by MCI against AT&T in the long-distance telephone market). 
 220. See supra Part II.B. 
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 This avenue—relatively small nods toward competition creating 
momentum towards further liberalization by increasing the power of 
alternative stakeholders—has long been a feature of the energy mar-
ket. PURPA provides one template. There was no inherent reason 
why enabling a narrow class of small generators to hook into the grid 
would necessarily lead to widespread competition within the energy 
generation sector. But PURPA revealed both a hunger for new gen-
eration options and, perhaps more importantly, created a constituen-
cy which could effectively press for still greater liberalization  
efforts.221 
 More recently, the renewable energy sector has also used its foot-
hold in state politics to successfully combat dominant energy players 
in the fight over climate change legislation. The 2010 defeat of Cali-
fornia’s Proposition 23—which would have effectively repealed Cali-
fornia’s carbon dioxide emissions regulations—is illustrative.222 As 
Eric Biber observes, 2010 was generally not a good year for support-
ers of environmental causes, in the energy sector or otherwise.223 
What made California different? Unlike many states, California has 
long aggressively promoted renewable energy and the renewable en-
ergy industry, creating a strong domestic political counterweight to 
traditional energy interests.224 Moreover, even companies that had 
deep ties to “dirty” energy production in California had also invested 
in greening technology and initiatives—sometimes to comply with 
state RPS mandates, sometimes to access new market opportunities 
spurred by their greener competitors.225 Together, these factors in-
creased the political leverage environmental proponents had within 
California and neutered some opposition that might have otherwise 
been expected from large energy interests. 
 The REC market offers a similar opening for competitive forces to 
gain a foothold amongst retail consumers and better position them-
selves to influence the regulatory and legislative agenda. The history 
                                                                                                                  
 221. See Vogelsang, supra note 207, at 24 (“Eventually, and with the help of new 
entrants and customer groups envisaging benefits they were able to convince regulators, 
courts and legislators about the benefits of liberalization.”). 
 222. See Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate 
Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 403-04 
(2013). 
 223. See id. at 400 (noting that at the federal level, any hopes of comprehensive climate 
change legislation were dashed by the landslide victory of conservative Republicans into 
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 225. See id. at 420-25. 
2015]  RENEWING ELECTRICITY COMPETITION 983 
 
of electricity competition is intricately tied up in the environmental 
and renewable energy movement. As noted above, the first step in 
electricity restructuring came in the form of PURPA—a statute de-
signed to promote the generation of renewable, environmentally sus-
tainable energy.226 Retail electricity restructuring was similarly pro-
moted as serving environmental goals—most notably, by giving con-
sumers the chance to choose partial or total green power options 
above and beyond what incumbent utilities were offering.227 Surveys 
indicated that large majorities were willing to pay at least slightly 
more money to have renewable power.228 Where the market for volun-
tary RECs exists, a market for green power choice likely exists along-
side of it. 
B.  Gaining New Consumers (and Constituents) 
 Voluntary REC market participants can also leverage their con-
tacts with their customers to promote support for restructuring by 
the consumers themselves. While the prior Section focused on the 
influence wielded by the REC sellers themselves, this Section em-
phasizes how REC consumers can be mobilized to counter the power 
of utility companies in front of utility commissions. Regulators “are 
responsive not only to the fixed preferences of well-informed voters, 
but also to the potential preferences of constituents who could become 
active and attentive if provoked.”229 Voluntary REC sales can help 
render coherent and salient a previously diffuse and disorganized 
consumer base which might favor restructuring. 
 Voluntary REC sales offer a particularly attractive opportunity for 
gaining consumers in the electricity sector because there is clearly 
room for new entrants to undercut existing programs from monopoly 
providers unaccustomed to competition. Already, unbundled REC 
sales—sales that do not require the physical delivery of electricity 
and thus bypass the natural monopoly—represent a majority of all 
                                                                                                                  
 226. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 227. See Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 7, at 184 (“[S]ome view the move toward 
greater consumer choice as a way to allow consumers to express demand for green power in 
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their electric bills for power from renewable sources”). 
 229. See PATASHNIK, supra note 30, at 156; see also Schraub, Sticky Slopes, supra note 
9, at 1260 (noting that while normal mobilization and countermobilization stories focus on 
“activat[ing] latent preferences,” social changes can also bring “completely new political 
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green power sales in the United States.230 Many monopoly states 
have “green pricing” programs where customers can purchase blocks 
of RECs from the incumbent. NC GreenPower (used by monopoly 
utilities in North Carolina), for example, offers RECs at a retail rate 
of $4 per 100 kilowatt/hours (kWh), or $2.50 wholesale.231 Against 
this figure, unbundled REC sales offer a very competitive alterna-
tive—the current market rate for RECs on the voluntary market is 
less than $1 per megawatt/hour (or 10 cents per 100 kWh).232 And un-
like retail competition itself, where friendly state commissions can 
block outright the emergence of lower-cost competitors, state utility 
commissions are sharply limited in their ability to limit voluntary 
REC sales.233 
 Potential profits are likely just the tip of the iceberg, however. 
More important from a retail restructuring perspective is the oppor-
tunity for new entrants to create a regular month-to-month relation-
ship with consumers and access important consumer data invaluable 
to power marketers.234 Monopoly status aside, incumbent utilities are 
at an advantage over potential upstarts because they already possess 
this intimate relationship with their consumers, a position which lets 
them act as a “gatekeeper between the consumer and the electric 
grid.”235 Even outside of a monopoly context, this sort of regular, rela-
tional interaction between company and consumer acts to reduce the 
consumers’ effective choices by channeling their economic energies 
into a loyal relationship with a single provider.236 Given the intimate 
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 233. See supra Part II.B. 
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Markets: Antecedents and Consequences, 23 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 255, 256 (1995) 
(defining “relational market behavior” as a consumers’ decision to engage in “purposeful 
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relationship incumbents already enjoy with electricity consumers, it 
has been historically difficult for potential competitors to build up 
even a potential constituency that might contemplate switching. And 
without a customer base willing to at least consider switching to a 
different provider, retail restructuring is little more than a theoreti-
cal debate.  
 Emerging “smart meter” reforms—which aim to give consumers 
real information about their electricity usage to help conserve energy 
and reduce usage during high-demand, high-price times—have 
opened up this relationship somewhat in recent years.237 For exam-
ple, the “green button” initiative, pioneered in California and now 
being promoted nationwide, seeks to provide consumers with “stand-
ard, routine, easy-to-understand access to their own energy usage 
data” that can be (if the consumer desires) shared with third-parties 
to assist them in managing their energy usage.238 For (legitimate) 
privacy reasons, however, this information is not openly available—
consumers must voluntarily elect to disclose it.239  
 Offering voluntary RECs gives third parties the opportunity to 
build a month-to-month electricity relationship similar to what the 
utilities enjoy (albeit on a much smaller scale). Crafting this relation-
ship opens the door to accessing the consumers’ smart-grid infor-
mation. Put bluntly, offering voluntary RECs to retail consumers of-
fers a credible way for electricity companies to convince those con-
sumers to give them access to their electricity usage data on a month-
to-month basis. This information is of essential import if potential 
                                                                                                                  
choice reduction” by entering into a loyal relationship with a single provider in lieu of 
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Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 
(2011); John R. Forbush, Regulating the Use and Sharing of Energy Consumption Data: 
Assessing California’s SB 1476 Smart Meter Privacy Statute, 75 ALB. L. REV. 341 (2012). 
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retail competitors are to persuade anyone that they can offer electric-
ity service at a lower price compared to the residents’ default  
operator.  
 In addition, once the consumer base is in place, companies can 
leverage their connections to the consumer to convert their interest 
in RECs into an interest in retail choice generally. To be sure, 
demonstration of a viable consumer base can have political impacts 
even where that base cannot be successfully mobilized, because the 
fact that the market exists is demonstrative of an economic (and thus 
potentially political) constituency favoring greater reforms.240 This 
dynamic helped promote support for RPS programs in many states 
where successful penetration by the voluntary market demonstrated 
sustained interest in and support for such renewable programs and 
was integral in subsequent decisions to pass mandatory RPS.241  
 Similar mechanics could play out in the restructuring context: 
From the beginning, the push for electricity restructuring has includ-
ed a strong environmental component as advocates sought to give 
consumers the ability to choose power providers that were greener 
than the incumbent monopolies. Consumers electing to buy voluntary 
RECs are likely to be consumers who would be amenable to buying 
(bundled) green electricity, or at the very least consumers who have 
demonstrated a willingness to be active participants in electricity-
purchasing decisions. Voluntary REC purchasers present a new po-
tentially salient energy constituency towards which policymakers 
must be responsive, which in turn alters the political dynamic of en-
ergy policy debates. 
 That said, the voluntary REC market offers specific opportunities 
for mobilizing consumers as potential constituents for retail electrici-
ty choice. The voluntary market is highly dependent on direct mar-
keting, which creates opportunities for direct interaction between 
company and consumer and allows them an effective avenue for pro-
moting alternative energy supply arrangements.242 Marketing theo-
rists have long asserted that such relationships between a company 
and its consumers can create a cadre of customers “committed to 
their market offerings.”243 Less explored is the prospect that these 
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consumers may themselves be enlisted as political allies for altering 
unattractive regulatory climates.244 While the American regulatory 
structure acts “as if ‘business’ and ‘consumers’ were in a basically ad-
versary relationship,”245 relational marketing suggests that consum-
ers do not (or at least do not always) view the brands they engage 
with in such hostile terms.246 Companies that gain the trust and loy-
alty of a cadre of consumers may be able to mobilize said consumers 
as a second front in endeavors to lobby regulators and policymakers. 
C.  Partial Victories and Limited Competition 
 Even if it does not result in total deregulation of the retail electric-
ity sector, voluntary REC sales can have more modest pro-
competitive effects. One potential candidate for reform is the possibil-
ity that vibrant, voluntary REC sales will increase support for man-
datory RPS programs. While RPS programs have been implemented 
in many states, there remain a significant number of holdouts.247 As 
noted above,248 a vibrant voluntary REC market can increase political 
support for mandatory RPS programs by demonstrating the existence 
of popular demand for renewable power options. 
 Another area where partial pro-competitive advances may be real-
ized is in the area of “net metering.” Net metering refers to arrange-
ments where local consumers install renewable generation units 
(most frequently solar) which feed additional renewable power into 
the system, off-setting some or all of their own power usage.249 Advo-
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in the consumers’ own self-interest). 
 247. See, e.g., Gabe Maser, Note, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost–Causation Boogie-
Woogie Fails to Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 
1833 (2012) (noting Indiana’s decision to forego an RPS requirement and instead have only 
a voluntary renewable energy target). 
 248. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta 
of Energy Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower 
Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2011) (discussing net metering policies whereby 
consumer-generators receive cash payments for excess power they generate and feed into 
the grid beyond their own usage). 
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cates of net metering have explicitly characterized it as an effort to 
“democratize the grid” and “take electricity services away from utili-
ties.”250 Ironically, such distributed generation has encountered 
heavy resistance in the southeastern United States, where abundant 
sunlight has proven no match for incumbent monopolies jealously 
protecting their exclusive right to sell power.251 But this might be 
changing. In Florida, a hybrid liberal/conservative alliance has begun 
pushing for new rules allowing rooftop-solar owners to sell their ex-
cess power directly to consumers.252 Framed as a direct challenge to 
“excessive utility control over Florida’s energy generation,” the initia-
tive combines liberal support for increased renewable energy options 
with conservative preference for freer markets and more open  
competition.253 
 Participants in the voluntary REC market have an opportunity for 
synergy with net metering advocates on at least three dimensions. 
First, where a consumer produces more renewable power than they 
consume, net metering should create an additional source of REC 
supplies that marketers can in turn resell to customers who either 
are unable or unwilling to directly participate in distributed genera-
tion programs. Second, where a consumer generates less renewable 
energy than their ultimate usage (that is, they are still partially de-
pendent on dirty energy from the grid), the relative decrease in elec-
tricity usage may still redound to the benefit of REC sellers by in-
creasing the margins on their REC sales.254 Finally, the entities 
                                                                                                                  
 250. Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to 
Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 657 (2012). 
 251. See Evan Halper, Rules Prevent Solar Panels in Many States with Abundant 
Sunlight, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/ 
la-na-no-solar-20140810-story.html#page=1. The Southeast is a region where regulatory 
opposition to retail competition is particularly entrenched. See Pierce, supra note 105, at 
484 (“In the Southeast, in particular, the ‘just say no’ utilities have been able to use the 
formidable powers of their state PUCs as a shield to protect them from FERC’s efforts to 
expose them to competition.”). 
 252. See Gavin Bade, GOP-Led Ballot Measure Seeks to Grow Rooftop Solar Market in 
Florida, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/gop-led-ballot-measure-
seeks-to-grow-rooftop-solar-market-in-florida/349598/. 
 253. Id. 
 254. This depends on the pricing model the REC seller uses. If they offer to cover a 
consumer’s entire energy usage for a single flat rate, then the REC seller benefits when the 
consumer uses less energy (and they have fewer RECs to compensate), while the consumer 
benefits if they use more power (getting more green energy for each dollar spent). By 
contrast, if the seller offers variable pricing, depending on the consumer’s actual electricity 
usage, then the REC seller has an incentive for the consumer to use more power, because it 
makes its money on the marginal cost of each credit sold, while consumers are incentivized 
to use less. 
  This problem—electricity programs providing an incentive for over-consumption, 
as opposed to energy efficiency—is of longstanding import in the power industry. 
Traditional block rates allowed utilities to cover their fixed capital costs by lowering their 
rates as more power was consumed (so long as the price paid by the average consumer 
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which generate renewable power—and thus RECs—will also often be 
best positioned to help install and maintain distributed generation 
resources. 
 Recent research on the diffusion of rooftop-solar installation has 
found a strong “neighbor” effect—persons are considerably more like-
ly to obtain household solar installations where others around them 
have done so as well.255 These cascade effects focus on the spatiality 
of adapting new technologies or practices, but they also point to the 
importance of social interactions between neighboring stakeholders 
as a means of altering status quo behavior.256 People are more likely 
to alter their behavior when presented with successful models of such 
alterations from their peers. And people are more likely to support 
changes to their settled practices if a proposed change is seen as an 
outgrowth of familiar purchases, behaviors, or models. In either case, 
local diffusion of the novel electricity product brings opportunities to 
further leverage the gains. 
 Functionally, REC markets give new market entrants access to 
customers in monopoly states and put them in a position where they 
can more effectively advocate for their interests in state politics. That 
does not guarantee that retail electricity restructuring will follow—
and perhaps that is how it should be. The risks and benefits of elec-
tricity competition are not uniform throughout all fifty states, and it 
may be quite proper that each state retain the ability to decide for 
itself whether and to what extent competition would benefit its citi-
zens. This decision, however, should be made on the merits in a polit-
ical climate where all relevant positions are aired and all affected 
constituencies are heard. No longer boxed out of the political economy 
of monopoly states, the inherently competitive nature of the REC 
market and the corresponding foothold it can give new market en-
trants means advocates for competition can press their case on a lev-
el (or at least less lopsided) playing field. 
                                                                                                                  
approximated the average cost of the wattage). These distorted prices in favor of 
overconsumption and modern pricing models have instead sought to increase the accuracy 
of price signals by having consumers pay the marginal cost of producing the next kilowatt 
of power. See Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 
39 ENVTL. L. 931, 947-48 (2009). 
 255. See Marcello Graziano & Kenneth Gillingham, Spatial Patterns of Solar 
Photovoltaic System Adoption: The Influence of Neighbors and the Built Environment, 15 J. 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY (forthcoming 2015). Note that this Article specifically examined rooftop 
solar diffusion in Connecticut, where the authors noted that political and regulatory bodies 
have taken substantial affirmative steps to encourage distributed generation. It is unclear 
whether these findings would replicate in more ambivalent political climates. 
 256. See generally William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, Adoption Curves and Social 
Interactions, 8 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 232 (2010) (identifying properties of adoption curves 
that imply the presence of social interactions and their effect on the adoption of new  
technologies). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 The voluntary REC market is unique in the electricity context: it 
allows electricity generators and other market participants the abil-
ity to directly connect with electricity consumers. This removes an 
important hurdle blocking the reinvigoration of electricity competi-
tion—neither incumbent providers nor unsympathetic state commis-
sions can wholly box out potential competitors from any participation 
in the retail electricity marketplace. Where restructuring proceeds 
from there will likely continue to vary from one state to the next. But 
even the partial incorporation of new players in the retail electricity 
market holds the potential to reinvigorate the largely moribund 
cause of electricity restructuring. As in the past, public demand for 
additional green energy options may be the best opportunity for see-
ing a renewal of electricity competition. 
